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ABSTRACT
Traditional knowledge can be protected, to some extent, under
various intellectual property laws. However, for the most part, there is
no effective international legal protection for this subject matter. This
has led to proposals for a sui generis regime to protect traditional
knowledge. The precise contours of the right are yet to be determined,
but a sui generis right could include perpetual protection. It could also
result in protection for historical communal works and for knowledge
that may be useful but that is not inventive according to the standards of
intellectual property law. Developing countries have been more
supportive of an international traditional knowledge right than
developed countries. At the same time, developing countries have been
critical of the impact of intellectual property rights on social issues such
as access to medicines and access to educational materials. In light of
developing country concerns about the negative effects of strong global
intellectual property rights, this paper uses a development-focused,
instrumentalist approach to assess the implications of a sui generis
traditional knowledge right. It concludes that some of the measures
sought may not achieve the desired outcome. Although intellectual
property can play a role in protecting traditional knowledge, a sui
generis intellectual property style right may hinder the equity-oriented
goals of some traditional knowledge communities.
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INTRODUCTION
Some communities possess useful knowledge and traditions that
have been passed down from one generation to another. These
traditional practices and artworks, or the medicinal knowledge may be
highly valued by the community, and possibly by others. However,
intellectual property law does not necessarily protect knowledge
relating to the medicinal uses of plants, reproductions of communal
works, traditional cultural practices, or spiritual rituals. This is because
much of this knowledge is not new or cannot be identified as having
1
been created by a particular individual.
Far from protecting this knowledge, intellectual property law may, in
some instances, have facilitated the taking and commercialization of this
traditional knowledge by individuals or entities that are external to the
traditional knowledge-generating community. The result is often an
inequitable situation in which the knowledge is used, including for
commercial purposes, without attribution or compensation to the
knowledge-generating community. This use or taking without consent
or compensation has been characterized as “bio-piracy” or
2
“misappropriation.” The taking and use (or misuse) of the cultural
works, genetic resources and knowledge of traditional and indigenous
peoples, has led to a call to protect traditional knowledge and
3
traditional cultural expressions.
This includes the possibility of
1. The various forms of traditional knowledge may implicate different kinds of
intellectual property. For example, patent law relates to medicinal traditional knowledge,
whereas artistic and cultural practices relate to copyright law, and indentifying symbols may
pertain to trademarks and geographical indications. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) (2006) (provides that copyright subsists “in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”). Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (this general
patentability provision states that only one who “invents or discovers” an invention that is
“new and useful” may obtain a patent).
2. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 1 (2001); Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade and Sustainable Development, 19
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 219 (2008).
3. In the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) context, traditional
cultural expressions can be considered a subset of traditional knowledge. Traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions are often seen as part of a single “integrated
heritage.” However, due to the specific legal and policy questions raised by traditional
cultural expressions in the intellectual property context, WIPO has separate, but parallel,
work programs for traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions.
See
Traditional Cultural Expressions (Folklore), WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/folklore/ (last
visited Sept. 22, 2010). This paper considers intellectual property as a broad category, despite
the many distinctions between patent law, copyright law, and trademark law. The focus of
this work is on the underlying similarities that inform intellectual property law and policy. As
such, reference to traditional knowledge will be used as a broad category that may include
traditional cultural expressions. Such grouping is not inconsistent with the concept of
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, and some early documents from
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legislation to create a sui generis traditional knowledge right.
4
Focusing on the issue of equity, this article uses an instrumentalist
approach to query whether a new intangible property right that is based
on an intellectual property model is likely to meet some of the
distributive justice goals of traditional knowledge holders and
developing countries. Part of the subtext of the traditional knowledge
narrative is about the effects of the history of colonialism. With respect
to the intersection between traditional knowledge and intellectual
property law, it becomes a discussion about equity, fairness, and what is
perceived to be a Eurocentric international intellectual property system
5
that favors Western methods of knowledge creation.
One of the substantial critiques of international intellectual property
law and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Agreement on Trade6
Related Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) has been its impact on
access to affordable knowledge goods. I suggest that it is useful,
therefore, to assess the potential distributive justice effects of a new
intangible property right before it is created. With the goal of access to
affordable knowledge goods in mind, I explore whether a sui generis
traditional knowledge right, which may include perpetual protection,
advances this goal. I start from the premise that knowledge is a public
good and that access to knowledge goods is in the public interest.
Intellectual property protected goods should therefore be affordable
the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Tradition Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) have even defined traditional cultural expressions
as a subset of traditional knowledge.
See WIPO IGC, MATTERS CONCERNING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
FOLKLORE —AN OVERVIEW ¶ 30, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3 (2001).
4. I use the term “equity” in the ordinary sense of the word, meaning that which is fair
and just, or appropriate in the circumstances. See Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th ed. 1999).
Naturally, what is considered “fair” may depend on one’s perspective.
5. The traditional knowledge dialogue has also been described as a discussion about
“value.” See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Piracy, Biopiracy and Borrowing: Culture, Cultural
Heritage and the Globalization of Intellectual Property 56 (Case Res. Paper Series in Legal
Stud., Working Paper No. 04–19, 2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=56921 (“This
same combination of derogation and appropriation or borrowing without compensation from
local knowledge have been important motivating forces behind contemporary efforts to
protect local knowledge. The development of rationales from protecting local knowledge has
in turn entailed constructing arguments to justify the worthiness of such knowledge for
intellectual property protection. This is essentially a discourse about value.”); Rosemary J.
Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the
Cultural Appropriation Controversy, in AFTER IDENTITY 254-255 (Dan Danielson and Karen
Engle eds.,1995) (arguing that Natives need to tell Native stories and that the law is based on
European culture, which is no longer acceptable in a post-colonial era).
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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and accessible. Moreover, access to affordable knowledge goods is a
laudable and worthwhile development goal, and one which the various
7
forms of intellectual property should support.
The goal of access to affordable knowledge goods is relevant to the
traditional knowledge discussion because developing countries are the
primary advocates of traditional knowledge at the World Intellectual
Property Organization (“WIPO”). Furthermore, their concerns about
the TRIPS can be described as largely related to the effect of
8
intellectual property rights on access to affordable knowledge goods.
9
Patents and copyright, in particular, have been criticized on this basis.
It is not a stretch to state, as a general proposition, that intellectual
property generating countries have benefitted from TRIPS far more
10
than developing countries. Further, the misappropriation allegations
made by developing countries and indigenous peoples appear to be
11
valid and well-documented. There are clearly some problems with the
7. See Mary W.S. Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for Copyright:
From Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 830–32 (2009);
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2821, 2885, 2891 (2006).
8. See,
e.g.,
WIPO,
AFRICAN GROUP SUBMISSION ON DOCUMENT
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/14/9 (2009). This can include, among
others, educational or artistic works that are subject to copyright or pharmaceutical products
that are subject to patent protection.
9. Joseph Straus, The Impact of the New World Order on Economic Development: The
Role of Intellectual Property Rights System, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2006)
(“[I]n 1994, TRIPs was at the center of multifaceted criticism, for both developing and
developed countries.”); see Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of
Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L.
279, 286 (2004) (“[S]erious questions arise as to the sustainability of the attempt in TRIPS to
resolve the international externality aspects of protecting new knowledge goods. An
additional criticism leveled at the emerging IPR system is that the agenda for increasing
protection has been articulated and pushed by rich-country governments effectively
representing the commercial interests of a limited set of industries that distribute knowledge
goods.”); Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus
World: The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 3 (2003), available at http://
www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/WIPO(A4)final0304.pdf (noting that the appropriateness of the
standards contained in the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries has been seriously
questioned, and that the TRIPS standards may be too high for these countries); see James
Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 0009 (2004) (critiquing TRIPS).
10. Marie Byström & Peter Einarsson, TRIPS: Consequences for Developing Countries
Implications for Swedish Development Cooperation 48–49 (2001) (consultancy report to the
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)).
11. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 1, 10–12, 47–50 (2001) (explaining documented cases, included the well-known
controversy over the patenting of “neem,” long used in Indian villages as a traditional
medicine, and outlining some of the jurisprudence involving Australian Aboriginal artists);
Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade and Sustainable Development, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
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current intellectual property structure.
The traditional knowledge dialogue has advanced to a stage where
there is growing recognition of the need to value and acknowledge the
12
contributions of indigenous and local communities.
There is an
attempt to maximize the benefits of traditional knowledge for these
13
communities while minimizing the harmful effects of misappropriation.
As part of this effort, there have been various studies on the protection
of traditional knowledge, and there is a wealth of valuable scholarship
on the relationship between traditional knowledge and intellectual
14
property.
Numerous scholars have concluded that traditional

POL’Y 219, 226–31 (2008) (explaining the controversy over the Rosy Periwinkle, the Neem
tree, the Enola Bean and others).
12. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 929 (Spring 2002); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge,
33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 248-61 (Spring 2001); Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of
Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2001); See generally MICHAEL F.
BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE (2003)
13. See WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: REVISED
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/16/5 (2010) (Providing
provisions against misappropriation and enhancing benefit sharing. See Art. 1 and Art. 2 for
rules for provisions against misappropriation and unfair competition. See Art. 6 on benefit
sharing, Art. 9 on duration of protection, and Art. 13 for enforcement of traditional
knowledge protection).
14. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 1, 10–14, 47–52 (2001); Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade, and Sustainable
Development, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 219 (2008); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS
Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 Case W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233 (Spring 2001);
Christine H. Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the
Answer? 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual
Recognition Agreements as a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional
Knowledge in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629 (2007); Stephen R. Munzer & Kal
Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27
CARD. ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (2009); David Castle & E. Richard Gold, Traditional Knowledge
and Benefit Sharing: From Compensation to Transaction, in ACCESSING AND SHARING THE
BENEFITS OF THE GENOMICS REVOLUTION 65 (Peter W.B. Phillips & Chika B. Onwuekwe
eds., 2007); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities,
Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 155 (2006); CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS
KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL
MEDICINE 52–57 (2006); Chidi Oguamanam, Localizing Intellectual Property in the
Globalization Epoch: The Integration of Indigenous Knowledge, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 135 (2004); Chidi Oguamanam, Local Knowledge as Trapped Knowledge: Intellectual
Property, Culture, Power and Politics, 11 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 29 (2008); Paul Kuruk,
The Role of Customary Law Under Sui Generis Frameworks of Intellectual Property Rights in
Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 67 (2007); Peter K.
Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property and the Global Élites: An Introduction, 10 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2002).

154 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1
15

knowledge can be only partially protected under the existing system.
16
Others have queried whether it should be treated as property at all.
The question that remains is how best to address the concerns of
traditional knowledge generating communities. Yet, the traditional
knowledge right that some developing countries and traditional
knowledge proponents support is based on an intellectual property
model, and therefore, has the potential to produce problems not unlike
those which have resulted under the current system. An international
sui generis intellectual property right for traditional knowledge may
hinder access to affordable knowledge goods, including for indigenous
and local communities.
17
Drawing on the notion of intellectual property ‘from below,’ this
paper aims to contribute to the discussion by evaluating the utility of an
intellectual property model for the protection of traditional knowledge.
This assessment is done in light of some of the stated goals of traditional
18
knowledge protection, and with a view to the potential impact of
19
proprietary traditional knowledge on affordable knowledge goods.
The creation of a new property right may serve as both an offensive and
defensive measure.
This article cautions that a legally binding
instrument that creates an exclusive proprietary traditional knowledge
right may not ultimately benefit indigenous and local communities.
While it is not entirely clear what an international legal instrument

15. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 929 (Spring 2002); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge,
33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 248–61 (Spring 2001); Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of
Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2001); Christine H. Farley, Protecting
Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer? 30 CONN. L. REV. 1
(1997) (discussing litigation over the use of Navajo cultural works in Australia); Paul Kuruk,
Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as a Policy Response to the
Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629
(2007).
16. Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property
Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARD. ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (2009).
17. I draw on the intellectual property ‘from below’ approach as outlined by Professor
Margaret Chon. The concept of viewing international law ‘from below’ can be attributed to
Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s seminal work, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW:
DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).
18. See WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: REVISED
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/16/5 (2010).
19. There is a variety of perspectives from which one can evaluate traditional
knowledge, including an economic, anthropological or human rights lenses. Although I touch
on these issues in this article, I do not purport to provide an economic analysis of the
propriety of protecting traditional knowledge, nor do I pursue a detailed analysis of the issue
of traditional knowledge through the lens of human rights law.
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to protect traditional knowledge might look like, a sui generis regime to
20
This is because this
protect such knowledge has been proposed.
subject matter does not easily fit within the existing categories of
intellectual property. A sui generis regime could result in a new
intangible property right that will exclude anyone other than the rights
holders from making use of this intergenerational knowledge without
consent. Possible characteristics of a traditional knowledge right
include perpetual protection, protection of historical communal cultural
works, and protection of knowledge that may be useful but that is not be
inventive or creative according to the standards of intellectual property
21
law.
In my view, there are two main difficulties of traditional knowledge
that render the benefits of a sui generis intellectual property style
traditional knowledge right questionable. First, the absence of clear
consensus about the meaning of the indigenous or local person creates
serious difficulties in defining the scope of application of the right. I
acknowledge, however, that there may be various legitimate reasons for
this lack of consensus, including historical and political reasons, which
go beyond the scope of the discussion in this paper. Second, the
proposed traditional knowledge right does not rectify the inequities
caused by the excesses of the current system. It seeks to address the
problems by expanding the intellectual property system rather than
22
attempting to correct the existing flaws by contracting the regime.
For the purposes of this paper, I approach the issue of traditional
knowledge from an intellectual property perspective, rather than
focusing on the broader issue of indigenous rights. Further, since there
is no widely accepted precise definition of tradition knowledge, in
evaluating the potential consequences of a sui generis intellectual
property style traditional knowledge right on accessible and affordable
knowledge goods, I temporarily disregard the ethnic limitations that are

20. EMMANUEL HASSAN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 44–45 (2010); WIPO IGC, PROPOSAL
PRESENTED BY THE AFRICAN GROUP TO THE FIRST MEETING OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE 6, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/10, (2001) (suggesting the need to develop a sui generis system for
genetic resources and community rights).
21. See WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: REVISED
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 27–30, 45, WIPO Doc. GRTKF/IC/16/5 (2010); Patent Act of
1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–104 (2006) (the requirements for patentability); Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122 (2006) (the scope and subject matter for copyright protection).
22. One could argue that creating a new right is one way to correct the existing flaws.
However, as I discuss later, this may bring its own set of problems.

156 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1

inherent in the definition and treat all intergenerational knowledge as
having equal value. In other words, in assessing the implications for cost
and access, I assume that all communities potentially generate
knowledge that could fit within the parameters of traditional
knowledge.
I take this approach in order to assess the protection of the
knowledge itself rather than the knowledge as it is understood when
linked to the power dynamics that have resulted from the history of
colonialism. This is not to suggest that the colonial history is irrelevant
to the current power structure. The impact of colonialism on
intellectual property law has already been discussed and well analyzed
23
elsewhere. Admittedly, cultural values may shape the way in which a
23. See David Castle & E. Richard Gold, Traditional Knowledge and Benefit Sharing:
From Compensation to Transaction, in ACCESSING AND SHARING THE BENEFITS OF THE
GENOMICS REVOLUTION 65, 68 (Peter W.B. Phillips & Chika B. Onwuekwe eds., 2007);
Ruth L. Gana , The Myth of Development, The Progress of Rights: Human Rights to
Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL’Y 315, 329 (1996) (observing that
developing countries were not signatories to the early international intellectual property
treaties but the treaty provisions were often extended to them through the colonial
administration); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local
Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 160–163 (2006) (arguing that colonialism created a unequal
power dynamic between countries and that such power discrepancies influenced intellectual
property law); CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS
KNOWLEDGE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL
MEDICINE 57 (2006) (arguing that the political, legal, and economic structures in most post
colonial societies reflect colonial values and are therefore complicit in the Western industrial
model. Hence, these states and their ecological policies fail to encourage indigenous
knowledge or truly reflect indigenous aspirations); Chidi Oguamanam, Localizing Intellectual
Property in the Globalization Epoch: The Integration of Indigenous Knowledge, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135, 154 (2004) (explaining that intellectual property laws are a result
of colonialism); Chidi Oguamanam, Local Knowledge as Trapped Knowledge, Intellectual
Property, Culture, Power and Politics, 11 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 29, 32 (2008) (describing
TRIPS as “the historical legacy of colonial disdain, exclusion, derogation and appropriation
as a policy framework for dealing with local knowledge”); Paul Kuruk, The Role of
Customary Knowledge Under Sui Generis Frameworks of Intellectual Property Rights in
Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 67, 86–92 (2007)
(discussing the effect of colonialization on laws in Africa, the United States, and New
Zealand); Peter K. Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property And the Global Élites: An
Introduction, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3-4 (2002) (“Against a background of
colonial and semi-colonial history, less developed countries begin to develop resentment
toward developed countries and multinational corporations. Eventually, this resentment
might spill over to the international intellectual property system and other trade-related
areas, thus creating a legitimacy crisis within the international trading system.”); Rosemary J.
Coombe, Cultural and Intellectual Properties: Occupying the Colonial Imagination, 16.1
POLAR 8 (1993); Chantal Thomas, Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development
Theory: Observations on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1195, 1198–99 (2000) (“The external
postcolonial development critique of the international order asserts that it, though informed
by seemingly egalitarian liberal ideals, perpetuated the ‘underdevelopment’—that is, the
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society treats property. Some may therefore consider it impossible,
even hypothetically, to isolate the knowledge from the knowledge
24
generating communities.
However, by separating the issue of the
protection of certain kinds of knowledge from the questions of power
and equality, one can evaluate the protection of the knowledge based on
the characteristics of the knowledge itself rather than on the
characteristics of the people who generate that knowledge. Thus, one
may consider, for example, the implications of protecting knowledge or
works that are based on the collective intellectual efforts of several
generations of an identifiable community, indigenous or otherwise.
Further, since the boundaries of traditional knowledge are yet to be
clearly defined, this approach can serve as a useful starting point from
which to assess the potential benefits and harms of a sui generis
traditional knowledge right. There may not be such a fundamental
difference between some of the knowledge generated by nonindigenous communities and that which is generated by indigenous or
25
local communities. If this is so, then a traditional knowledge right
could encompass a wide range of material from several different cultural
groups.
The traditional knowledge narrative suggests that intellectual
property law is under inclusive because it fails to protect much of the
knowledge and creations of traditional knowledge generating
communities. However, intellectual property may be a poor tool for
addressing traditional knowledge concerns, except to the extent that
intellectual property law encroaches on indigenous and local
communities. In my view, a significant portion of the problem is due to
the overreach of intellectual property law. By this I mean that the
various forms of intellectual property have been used to assert rights in
ways that tend to disregard competing interests, which should be given
greater value. While I question the utility of a sui generis right, I
acknowledge that there may be a role for defensive uses of intellectual
26
property. Nonetheless, I suggest, with a view to respecting traditional
entrenched economic inequality relative to the North—of Southern countries, by failing to
correct economic disadvantages bequeathed to the South by colonialism.”).
24. Dorothy E. Roberts, Why Culture Matters to Law: the Difference Politics Makes in
CULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE LAW, AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R.
KEARNS, EDS. 83 (1999) (Observing that Culture matters to law and that apparently neutral
legal principles that purport to disregard culture effectively privilege the existing dominant
cultural norms.)
25. In other words, various communities may generate (and may have generated
greater quantities before industrialization) ecological knowledge, community artwork, songs,
or culturally specific textiles, for example.
26. See infra Section V, Part B (“Intellectual Property Related Solutions that Don’t
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knowledge while encouraging access to affordable knowledge goods,
that it would be preferable to curtail rather than expand the global
27
intellectual property regime.
Part II of this paper contextualizes the debate by providing some
background about TRIPS, the allegations of bio-piracy and the
international discussions on traditional knowledge. The third part of
the paper outlines the analytical framework, which aims to take into
account the perspective of developing countries as well as the benefit to
the public in having access to affordable knowledge goods. Part IV of
the paper discusses some of the rationales for intellectual property and
compares them to the goals of traditional knowledge. The paper
identifies some of the challenges of utilizing an intellectual property
model to create a sui generis regime for the protection of this
intergenerational knowledge. As part of that discussion, I draw
parallels between the misappropriation concerns expressed by
traditional or indigenous communities and those expressed by
individuals from other communities regarding control over genetic
resources. Finally, I offer some preliminary suggestions about how
reframing the debate may assist in advancing the dialogue.

I. THE TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE QUESTION
A. The Backlash against TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement was a major development in international
intellectual property law because it established minimum enforceable
standards. However, the increased global protection for intellectual
property rights has generated some negative reaction, particularly in
28
respect of developing country issues. For instance, the international
Require an Expansion of the Existing Regime”); see Daniel Wuger, Prevention of
Misappropriation of Intangible Cultural Heritage Through Intellectual Property Laws in POOR
PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 183, 197 (J. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler eds, 2004). I thank Margaret
Chon for underscoring the value of defensive uses of intellectual property.
27. I speak of a global intellectual property regime rather than the TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 6, specifically. First, while TRIPS is significant because it incorporates the Berne
Convention, infra note 94, and the Paris Convention, infra note 116, by reference and sets
minimum enforceable standards, it is only one of several intellectual property treaties.
Secondly, the work on traditional knowledge is taking place beyond the context of TRIPS. It
is therefore helpful to consider the international intellectual property system, to the extent
one exists, as more than just TRIPS.
28. See James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property,
2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009, 2 (2004) (criticizing the WIPO for increasing intellectual
property rights to the detriment of developing countries); Laurence R. Helfer, Towards a
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intellectual property regime has been characterized as reflecting
29
In addition, TRIPS has been criticized for its
Western values.
detrimental impact on various issues. These range from the relationship
between patents and access to medicines, and copyright and access to
educational materials, to allegations of patent-related bio-piracy and the
30
misappropriation of cultural heritage.
One of the salient concerns about the TRIPS has been its effect on
access to affordable knowledge goods. Patents and copyright, in
particular, have been criticized on this basis. From a distributive justice
lens, this appears to be a fair critique. Arguably, intellectual property
generating countries have benefited from TRIPS far more than
31
developing countries. This is because information-exporting countries
Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 973–974
(2007) (describing the work of the WTO and WIPO being “brought . . . to a virtual standstill”
by resistance to the global expansion of IP rights); Open Society Institute, Geneva
Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization 2 (2004), available
at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/genevadeclaration.html (stating that a uniform approach
that “embraces the highest levels of intellectual property protection for everyone leads to
unjust and burdensome outcomes for countries that are struggling to meet the most basic
needs of their citizens”).
29. Adebambo Adewopo, The Global Intellectual Property System and Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Prognostic Reflection, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 749, 749–50 (2002); Olufunmilayo B.
Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and
Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 160–63
(2006) (positing that the global intellectual property regime reflects cultural hierarchies, with
most developing country cultures considered less advanced, and their values therefore not
reflected in the IP treaties); Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Intellectual Property Rights and
Traditional Knowledge: The Case of Yoga, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2866–2871 (2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005298. Developing countries were initially allowed a
grace period to implement their TRIPS obligations, which has now passed. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 66 However, a further exception has been made for least
developed countries with ressect to the protection of pharmaceutical products. This exception
was created under para 7 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which states:
“We also agree that the least-developed country members will not be obliged, with respect to
pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS
Agreement or to enforce rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016,
without prejudice to the right of least-developed country members to seek other extensions of
the transition periods as provided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct
the Council for TRIPS to take the necessary action to give effect to this pursuant to Article
66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.”
30. See Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the
Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 171 (2000) (noting the patentrelated health concerns of developing country members); Lawrence R. Helfer, Towards a
Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 986–88
(2007); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional
Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
547, 548–49 (2003) (discussing the North-South division and the negative reaction of farmers
in India to the TRIPS Agreement).
31. EMMANUEL HASSAN, OHID YAQUB & STEPHANIE DIEPEVEEN, INTELLECTUAL
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tend to favor a globalized protectionist model in order to maximize their
32
economic gains. Unfortunately, under this kind of protectionist model,
intellectual property may extend into other social spheres and cultural
objects may be subject to appropriation and commercialized for use on
33
global markets. In sum, a protectionist model benefits industrialized
34
rather than industrializing countries.
An international intellectual property model can be described as
protectionist if it tends towards longer periods of protection rather than
shorter terms of protection, creates more property rights rather than
less, imposes uniform substantive minimum standards of protection on
all countries, and removes from States the discretion to adjust the
35
substantive standards to suit their level of economic development.
This is not unlike the situation that has resulted under TRIPS and led to
debates about the misappropriation of traditional knowledge. In
response, various international organizations, including the WTO, have
been engaged in discussions about the relationship between traditional
knowledge and intellectual property. Thus, for example, the 2001 WTO
36
Doha Ministerial Declaration directs the Council for TRIPS to explore
the relationship between TRIPS, the Convention on Biological Diversity
37
and the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 48 (2010).
32. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 190–191 (1996).
33. Id.
34. Consider, for example, the comments of the United States Trade Representative
Ambassador Ron Kirk about the importance of intellectual property rights for American
industries. Ambassador Kirk’s written speech characterizes innovation and creativity as “the
engines of the American economy” and outlines an agenda which is aimed at adequately
protecting American intellectual property rights in foreign nations. His speech describes
intellectual property piracy as a “job killer” and an “export killer.” See Ambassador Ron
Kirk, Protecting Tomorrow: IP and Green Technology (April 26, 2010), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2010/april/remarksambassador-ron-kirk-world-intellectual (last visited October 15, 2010); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO
QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 4 (2010)
(underlining the importance of intellectual property to the United States Economy); see Nam
D. Pham, The Impact of Innovation and the Role of Intellectual Property Rights on U.S.
Productivity, Competitiveness, Jobs, Wages, and Export 52 (2010), available at
http://www.memopage.com/bourse/scriptnews/includes/openwysiwyg2/uploaded_docs/15567_gipc_execstudy.pdf (this research paper,
which was prepared for the United States Chamber of Commerce, concludes that intellectual
property industries are key to sustaining American economic growth and that they are more
competitive than non-intellectual property industries
35. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 189 (1996).
36. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6.
37. Convention on Biological Diversity (with annexes), concluded at Rio de Janeiro on
June 5, 1992, [hereinafter CBD] 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992); WTO, Ministerial
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However, the primary international forum for negotiating an
38
international instrument to protect traditional knowledge is the WIPO.
The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (“IGC”) was
established by the WIPO General Assembly in October 2000 to study
the relationship between intellectual property and these related
39
subjects.
The WIPO IGC is mandated to undertake text-based
negotiations with the objective of drafting an international legal
instrument to “ensure the effective protection” of genetic resources,
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions (collectively
40
referred to as traditional knowledge for the purposes of this paper).
B. What Is Traditional Knowledge?
But what is traditional knowledge? More than ten years following
its establishment, the WIPO IGC struggles to reach a clear definition of
traditional knowledge.
The definition is complicated because
indigenous peoples, communities and nations may be holders of
Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 19, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, [hereinafter Doha
Declaration]. For example, the TRIPS Council is working on proposals to address the issue
of disclosure of the origin of the genetic materials used in respect of gene related patents. See
Background
and
the
Current
Situation,
WTO
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/art27_3b_background_e.htm (last visited Sept.
10, 2010).
38. I will therefore direct much of my attention in this piece to the work that has been
going on at WIPO and the documents that have been produced as a result of those efforts.
39. WIPO, MATTERS CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/26/6
(2000).
40. Traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions are often seen as part of
a single “integrated heritage.” However, due to the specific legal and policy questions raised
by traditional cultural expressions in the intellectual property context, WIPO has separate,
but parallel work programs for traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions.
See Traditional Cultural Expressions (Folklore), WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/folklore/
(last visited Sept. 22, 2010). This paper considers intellectual property as a broad category
despite the many distinctions between patent law, copyright law and trademark law. The
focus of this work is on the underlying similarities that inform intellectual property law and
policy. As such, reference to traditional knowledge will be used as a broad category that may
include traditional cultural expressions. Such grouping is not inconsistent with the concept of
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, and some early WIPO IGC
documents have even defined traditional cultural expressions as a subset of traditional
knowledge.
See WIPO, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE ¶ 30,
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3 (2001). The text of such agreement is to be submitted to
the WIPO General Assembly by 2011. For the recent IGC mandate, see WIPO
IGC, MATTERS CONCERNING THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE,
WIPO Doc. WO/GA/38/9 (2009).
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traditional knowledge, but not all traditional knowledge holders are
41
necessarily indigenous. Further, since traditional knowledge holders
are incredibly diverse, it has been suggested that it may not be possible
42
to have a single definition of the term. Thus, despite the attempt to
define traditional knowledge in relation to indigenous peoples, the
category of persons included as traditional knowledge holders is
potentially broader than indigenous peoples and nations. Moreover,
traditional knowledge may be difficult to distinguish from other types of
43
knowledge.
There are various descriptions of traditional knowledge in the
44
literature. The WIPO Secretariat chose a working definition that
45
reflected the general approach used in other international fora.
Traditional knowledge is loosely defined by WIPO as including:
“tradition-based literary, artistic or scientific works; performances;
inventions; scientific discoveries; designs; marks, names and symbols;
undisclosed information; and all other tradition-based innovations and
creations resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific,
46
literary, or artistic fields.”
41. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1998–1999), 26 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/index/html.
42. Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 240 (Spring 2001).
43. WIPO IGC, MATTERS CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE
¶ 63–70, WIPO Doc.
GRTKF/IC/1/3 (2001); see Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional
Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 241–42 (Spring 2001).
44. See, e.g. Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A TRIPSCompatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 140–41 (Spring 2005) (“Characteristically,
traditional knowledge is thus knowledge that: is traditional only to the extent that its creation
and use are part of the cultural traditions of a community–’traditional,’ therefore, does not
necessarily mean that the knowledge is ancient or static; is representative of the cultural
values of a people and thus is generally held collectively; is not limited to any specific field of
technology or the arts; is ‘owned’ by a community . . . .”); Angela R. Riley, “Straight
Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV.
69, 77 (2005) (“indigenous peoples’ claims to cultural property include not only places and
objects (and all other physical materials of a particular culture), but also traditions or
histories that are connected to the group’s cultural life, including songs, rituals, ceremonies,
dance, traditional knowledge, art, customs, and spiritual beliefs.”).
45. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1998–1999), 25 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/index/html.
46. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE—OPERATIONAL TERMS AND
DEFINITIONS 11, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9 (2002). For the purpose of its 2008
Gap Analysis, WIPO described TK as “referring in general to the content or substance of
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The term “tradition-based” refers to “knowledge systems, creations,
innovations and cultural expressions” which have been transmitted from
47
one generation to the next.
In addition, the knowledge system is
generally perceived as pertaining to a particular people or territory.
Finally, it is described as knowledge that is not necessarily old or static
48
but rather that evolves in response to a changing environment.
As discussed, the variety of subject matter that can be described as
traditional knowledge includes: traditional medicinal practices, such as
Indian Ayurvedic medicine, traditional farming practices, knowledge
relating to the uses of certain biological or chemical resources, and
49
traditional dances, songs, or rituals.
Thus, traditional knowledge,
broadly speaking, includes cultural works as well as intergenerational
knowledge about the properties of certain plants, such as the appetite
suppressing qualities of the Hoodia Cactus.
Broadly speaking,
traditional knowledge can be described as the result of intellectual
activity, which is handed down through the generations, and which
pertains to particular cultural groups.
As I will elaborate on below, this broad definition of traditional
knowledge is one of its frailties.

knowledge resulting from intellectual activity in a traditional context, and includes the
knowhow, skills, innovations, practices and learning that form part of traditional knowledge
systems, and knowledge embodying traditional lifestyles of indigenous and local
communities, or contained in codified knowledge systems passed between generations. It is
not limited to any specific technical field, and may include agricultural, environmental and
medicinal knowledge, and knowledge associated with genetic resources. This general
description of TK is based on the work of the Committee itself.” See WIPO IGC, THE
PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: DRAFT GAP ANALYSIS: REVISION 4, WIPO
Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/5/(b) Rev. (2008); WIPO IGC, MATTERS CONCERNING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
FOLKLORE 11, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3 (2001).
47. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE—OPERATIONAL TERMS AND
DEFINITIONS 11, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9 (May 20, 2002)
48. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE—OPERATIONAL TERMS AND
DEFINITIONS 11, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9 (May 20, 2002); GRAHAM DUTFIELD
& UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 7 (2008).
49. Emmanuel Hassan, Ohid Yaqub & Stephanie Diepeveen, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 39–40 (2010)
(traditional knowledge may include: literary, artistic or scientific works, agricultural
technologies and techniques, religious or spiritual practices, dance or medical treatments);
Bio-piracy of Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Knowledge Digital Library,
www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Biopiracy.asp?GL=3DEng (last visited Sept. 8,
2010).
Some aspects of Yoga and Ayurvedic medicine may be protectable as IP. For
example, some Yoga poses have been copyrighted, and certain Ayurvedic products may be
protected under trademark law. See, e.g., BIKRAM’S BEGINNING YOGA CLASS / BIKRAM
CHOUDHURY WITH BONNIE JONES REYNOLDS, Registration No. TX0005259325 (2000)
(Copyright Registration).
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C. The Existing Legal Framework, Biopiracy and Traditional Knowledge
In this section of the paper, I will discuss the relationship between
traditional knowledge and intellectual property, and provide some
examples of biopiracy and misappropriation.
Some traditional knowledge can be protected as intellectual
50
property, while some cannot. The international dialogue relates to the
types of traditional knowledge that are not subject to any internationally
recognized legal right.
Since the most controversial stories of
misappropriation relate to patent and copyright, I focus on these two
kinds of intellectual property in relation to traditional knowledge.
Traditional knowledge will not be protected by intellectual property
law if it is already in the public domain, or if it cannot otherwise meet
the criteria for intellectual property protection. It may not be possible
to meet the criteria for patent protection, for example, if the claimed
51
invention is not new, useful and non-obvious. If the information has
not been kept secret, it cannot be protected under the law of trade
52
secret and confidential information. If the work is not an “original”
work within the meaning of copyright law, it will not be copyrightable,
and if it is not a mark used in the course of trade it will not be

50. See Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81
TEMP. L. REV. 433, 484–85 (Summer 2008) (noting the different types of legal protection that
is available for the two types of traditional knowledge); Daniel Gervais, Traditional
Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV
137, 149–60 (Spring 2005) (analyzing traditional knowledge using existing intellectual
property framework and showing the difficulty of protecting some types of traditional
knowledge); Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1033 (2007) (“[R]efined products based on traditional knowledge
and genetic resources are protected via international IP law, while the underlying traditional
knowledge and resources are not.”); STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK ON ISSUES AND OPTIONS
FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS IN PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND MAINTAINING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 4–5 (2005).
51. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty is destroyed if:
the invention was “known or used by others in the [United States]” prior to the applicant’s
date of invention, the invention was “described in a printed publication” by anyone anywhere
in the world prior to the applicant’s date of invention, the invention was described by another
in an issued patent or published patent application prior to the applicant’s date of invention,
the invention was put into public use or placed on sale for more than 1 year prior to the
patent application date, or the applicant did not in fact discover or invent the subject matter
he or she seeks to patent); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 27.1 (provision governing
patentable subject matter).
52. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990) (this uniform code has been
adopted in 45 US states as of 2007); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 39 (provision
governing protectable subject matter of trade secrets).
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protectable under trademark law.
Yoga is an example of subject matter that has been described as
traditional knowledge and which is partially protected through
intellectual property law. Although it has become popular throughout
the world, yoga is a traditional practice that originated in India several
54
generations ago. While yoga per se is not protectable, yoga poses have
been copyrighted in the United States, leading to debates about whether
55
yoga is in the public domain.
Other well-known examples of
traditional knowledge include the medicinal uses of spices such as
56
turmeric and plants like the hoodia cactus, or neem.
The patenting of turmeric is an example of alleged misappropriation.
Although the traditional knowledge about the uses of turmeric is not
protectable, two Indian expatriates based in the United States obtained
57
an American patent on the use of turmeric in wound healing.
Turmeric is a spice used in Indian cooking. It has also been used in
traditional medicinal practices to heal wounds and rashes. The Council
of Scientific and Industrial Research (“CSIR”) in India challenged the
validity of the patent, arguing that the use of turmeric was not novel
53. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §102 (originality requirement); Trademark Act of 1946,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1055; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 15 (provision governing
protectable subject matter of trademarks).
54. See Patent Exploitation, The TIMES OF INDIA (May 22, 2007, 12:13 AM),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Patent_Exploitation/articleshow/2065331.cms (explaining
that the yoga industry is estimated to be worth approximately $3 billion dollars in the United
States and $8 billion dollars worldwide); ELIZABETH DE MICHELIS, A HISTORY OF
MODERN YOGA: PATANJALI AND WESTERN ESOTERICISM 2 (2004) (Stating generally that
the origins of modern yoga that is prevalent today began over 150 years ago).
55. See generally Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Intellectual Property Rights and Traditional
Knowledge: The Case of Yoga, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2866–2871 (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005298; BIKRAM’S BEGINNING YOGA CLASS / BIKRAM
CHOUDHURY WITH BONNIE JONES REYNOLDS, Registration No. TX0005259325 (2000)
(Copyright Registration).
56. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (United Kingdom), Integrating
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy 76 (2002) (explaining that extracts from
the neem tree have long been used in India to fight off fungal infections, as well as for various
other purposes. In 1994, the European Patent Office granted a patent to an American
company and the U.S. Department of Agriculture for a method of controlling fungus on
plants using extracts of neem oil. A coalition of Indian farmers and non-governmental
organizations alleged that the patent was based on centuries of Indian traditional knowledge
and successfully argued that it should not be patentable); Lee Gillespie-White & Eric
Garduño, Treading an Independent Course for Protecting Traditional Knowledge,
International Intellectual Property Institute (2002) (discussing the hoodia cactus). See U.S.
Patent No. 6,126,950 (filed April 10, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,368,856 (filed Aug. 2, 1993);
U.S. Patent No. 5,356,628 (filed Dec. 2, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 5,298,251 (filed July 21, 1993);
Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
73, 76–77 (2003) (discussing the neem case).
57. U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993).
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because it had been used medicinally in India for thousands of years.
The CSIR supported its claim with a printed publication from an Indian
58
medical association and was successful in having the patent revoked.
However, if the traditional medicinal knowledge had not been
59
documented, the patent may not have been invalidated.
An example of alleged biopiracy is that of the hoodia cactus plant.
The knowledge held by the San people of southern Africa about the use
60
of the hoodia cactus as an appetite suppressant is not protectable. Yet
an invention based on this knowledge was protected through patent law
and licensed to Pfizer. Several generations of the San people of

58. U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993) (all claims cancelled as of April 21,
th
1998 in Reexamination Certificate (3500 )); Bio-piracy of Traditional Knowledge, Traditional
Knowledge
Digital
Library,
http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Biopiracy.asp?GL=Eng (last visited Sept. 8,
2010); Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (United Kingdom), Integrating Intellectual
Property Rights and Development Policy 76 (2002); Alyson Slack, Turmeric, 15 TED CASE
STUDIES 700 (2004), available at http://www1.american.edu/ted/turmeric.htm; Graham
Dutfield, TRIPS Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233,
247–48 (Spring 2001); Shubha Ghosh, Traditional Knowledge, Patents, and the New
Mercantilism (Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 885, 898–902 (2003) (describing
the turmeric controversy surrounding the cancellation of Dr. Shiva’s turmeric patent);
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local
Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
155, 172 (2006) (describing the cancellation of all claims in U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504);
Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
73, 93-97 (2003) (describing the cancellation of all claims in U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed
Dec. 28, 1993) and mentioning turmeric patent claims that have not been cancelled such as
U.S. Patent No. 6,048,533 (filed Sept. 1, 1998) and U.S. Patent No. 5,897,865 (filed June 30,
1997)); Maggie Kohls, Blackbeard or Albert Schweitzer: Reconciling Biopiracy, 6 CHI. KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 108, 120-21, 131 (2007) (describing the cancellation of all claims in U.S.
Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993) and stating that the turmeric case created a
negative perception of United States patent examination procedures).
59. See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (Novelty is destroyed if prior art is
found describing the invention seeking patent protection. Prior art can be an invention that
was “known or used by others in [the United States]” prior to the applicant’s date of
invention. In addition, it can be an invention “described in a printed publication” by anyone
anywhere in the world prior to the applicant’s date of invention, or described by another in an
issued patent or published patent application prior to the applicant’s date of invention. In
this instance, the government of India was able to challenge the novelty of the patent because
the traditional knowledge had been documented in a printed publication. However, this is
not always the case); Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical
Limitation on Prior Art in Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 680-683 (discussing the neem
controversy and how the geographic limitation in 35 U.S.C. § 102 creates problems regarding
the use of inventions from developing countries).
60. See Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (United Kingdom), Integrating
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy 77–78 (2002); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa,
Piracy, Biopiracy, and Borrowing: Culture, Cultural Heritage and the Globalization of
Intellectual Property 15–16 (Case Res. Paper Series in Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 04-19,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=596921.
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southern Africa have used this plant to stave off hunger. An extract
from the plant was patented for its hunger-fighting properties, and a
license was granted to the pharmaceutical giant, Pfizer. Unlike the
61
turmeric case, the patent on the plant extract was not invalidated. The
pharmaceutical giant could profit if its Hoodia-based weight loss drug is
62
successful, while the San remain in poverty.
Unfortunately, even if it has some social or economic value,
medicinal knowledge about the uses of turmeric or hoodia cannot be
63
protected under the current regime. First, the knowledge has been
around for generations. It would, therefore, fail to meet the test of
64
novelty under patent law. Secondly, the knowledge is not attributable
to a particular individual or entity. In other words, there is no
identifiable creator, but possibly a collective of creators. It has been
suggested that the communal nature of traditional knowledge is not an
obstacle to protection because it is possible to have collective ownership
65
of an intellectual property right. However, while group work can be
61. U.S. Patent No. 7,166,611 (filed June 22, 2004) (this patent is cross referenced to
U.S. Pat. No. 6,376,657, granted Apr. 23, 2002, which is a U.S. National Phase of
PCT/GB98/01100, filed Apr. 15, 1998).
62. See Rachel Wynberg, Rhetoric, Realism and Benefit-Sharing: Use of Traditional
Knowledge of Hoodia Species in the Development of an Appetite Suppressant, 7 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 851, 865 (2004) (from the Benefit Sharing Agreement between the CSIR and
the San, only between 0.03 percent and 1.2 percent of net sales of the product is given to the
San because the San royalty only constitutes royalties received by CSIRfor the product);
Rachel Wynberg, Sharing the Crumbs with the San, BioWatch South Africa (March 2003),
available at http://www.biowatch.org.za/main.asp? include=docs/clippings/csir-san.htm
(potential commercial profitability of the drug was estimated to be between $1 billion and $8
billion USD a year); see also Rachel Wynberg, Doris Schroeder & Roger Chennells, Green
Diamonds of the South: An Overview of the San-Hoodia Case, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
CONSENT AND BENEFIT SHARING: LESSONS FROM THE SAN-HOODIA CASE 89–124 (Rachel
Wynberg, Doris Schroeder & Roger Chennells eds. 2009); Rachel Wynberg et al., Policies for
Sharing Benefits from Hoodia, in Indigenous Peoples, CONSENT AND BENEFIT SHARING:
LESSONS FROM THE SAN-HOODIA CASE 127-41 (Rachel Wynberg, Doris Schroeder & Roger
Chennells eds., 2009).
63. See Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on
Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 680–683 (2003) (discussing the neem
controversy and how the geographic limitation in the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102
creates problems with respect to the use and patenting of inventions that originate in
developing countries). 35 U.S.C. § 102 allows for the patenting of an invention unless it was
known or used by others in the United States, or patented or described in a printed
publication in the United States or another country before it was invented by the patent
applicant. So, if an invention was known or used by others in a foreign country but not
patented or described in any printed publication, 35 U.S.C. §102 does not prohibit it from
being patented in the United States.
64. See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (This provision requires that the
invention be new. Therefore, if there is documentation that the invention was already within
the public domain prior to filing the patent application, a patent may not be issued).
65. See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 116 (This provision allows a group of inventors
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protected under intellectual property law, the group still needs to be
clearly identified as a collective of individuals who have each
66
contributed to the creation or the innovation.
The inability to protect traditional knowledge leads to what appears
to an inequitable result. The inadequacy of intellectual property law in
preventing such uses has prompted a call to protect this
67
intergenerational knowledge.
This becomes a question of equity
because persons foreign to the group make use of their knowledge and
are able to profit by obtaining formal legal protection through the use of
intellectual property laws. Yet, the same laws are not effective in
protecting the range of useful knowledge of these local and indigenous
groups. The contradiction lies in the fact that intellectual property
rights were sought because of the perceived value in the knowledge, yet
the knowledge itself is not subject to any kind of internationally
recognized legal right. The essence of the critique is about the injustice
of the situation. In other words, it seems that the local and indigenous
communities are not being treated fairly in these exchanges.
This is not to say that traditional knowledge cannot receive any
protection under existing laws. Traditional knowledge and intellectual
property converge in some areas but are quite distinct in other
68
respects. Thus, some kinds of traditional knowledge can be protected
as intellectual property. For example, traditional knowledge holders
make use of trademarks and geographical indications to protect marks

to jointly file for one invention even if the group of inventors did not “physically work
together or at the same time” and did not make the same “type or amount contribution.”
However, all inventors must apply jointly and make the required oath of inventorship as
described in 35 U.S.C. § 115).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 172 (Third
World Network ed., 2008) (referring to U.S. patent no. 5,304,718 on quinoa which was
subsequently invalidated, and products based on plant materials and knowledge from
indigenous communities such as Neem tree, kava, barbasco, endod, and turmeric) (citing Pat
Roy Mooney, The Parts of Life: Agricultural Biodiversity, Indigenous Knowledge, and the
Role of the Third System, 152–54 (1998)); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional
Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property
Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP L. REV. 155, 168–79 (2006); Dr. Gerard Bodeker,
Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights & Benefit Sharing, 11 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 785 (Summer 2003); Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade, and Sustainable
Development, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENTL. L. & POL’Y 219 (2008); Christine H. Farley, Protecting
Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1
(1997); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 233 (Spring 2001).
68. Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81
TEMP. L. REV. 433, 443–53 (Summer 2008).
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that identify the goods as originating from a particular community.
Nonetheless, the existing intellectual property mechanisms for
70
protecting traditional knowledge are insufficient. This leads to the
possibility of creating a new category of intangible property.
D. Creating New Categories of Intellectual Property
The starting point for WIPO appears to be an expansive definition
of intellectual property that can encompass this new subject matter,
even if it does not fit within the current regime. According to a 1990
WIPO study, the 1967 WIPO Convention is clear that intellectual
property is a broad concept that can include matter that does not
71
currently fall within existing categories. The definition of intellectual
property includes “all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in
72
the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields.”
WIPO defines its involvement in the possible protection of
traditional knowledge to the extent that the knowledge could be

69. Doris Estelle Long, Is Fame All There Is? Beating Global Monopolists at Their
Own Marketing Game, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 123, 155–58 (2008) (identifying the use
of trademark law as a way to strengthen local identities and protect traditional knowledge).
One example is that of the Maori trademark in New Zealand; Creative Nz Agrees To
Transfer Maori Trademark—Toi Iho Tm, VOXY.CO.NZ (May 21, 2010, 6:12 PM),
http://www.voxy.co.nz/national/creative-nz-agrees-transfer-maori-trademark-toi-ihotm/5/49511 (describing the transfer of the Toi Iho trade marks to the Toi Iho Foundation);
Susy Frankel, Trademarks and Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Intellectual Property, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 433, 434
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, eds., 2008) (“Indigenous peoples have recognized
that . . . existing trademark regimes may be a means by which to protect their cultural icons,
signs, and symbols.”).
70. See, e.g., COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMM’N OF PREVENTION OF
DISCRIMINATION AND PROT. OF MINORITIES WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS, THE MATAATUA DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1 (1993); Mathew Rimmer, Australian Icons:
Authenticity Marks and Identity Politics, 3 INDIGENOUS L.J. 139, 153–54, 164–65 (2004)
(describing the limitations of existing copyright, trademark law, and authenticity marks in
protecting aboriginal artwork); Graham Dutfield, Protecting Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore: A Review of Progress in Diplomacy and Policy Formulation, International Trade &
Sustainable
Development
Series,
6–7
(2003),
available
at
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Dutfield%20%20Protecting%20TK%20and%20Fol
klore%20-%20Blue%201.pdf (“Asserting a property right over knowledge is insufficient to
prevent abuses when so much traditional knowledge has fallen into the public domain and
can no longer be controlled by the original TK holders.”).
71. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1998–1999), 6 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/index/html.
72. Id. at 16, 25; WIPO, Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization art. 2 (viii), (amended 1979).
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considered intellectual property. The organization therefore recognizes
that international intellectual property law is not static, but rather that it
is possible to create new categories of intellectual property.
For instance, under TRIPS the meaning of intellectual property
expanded to include subject matter, like geographical indications, that
had not previously been explicitly protected as intellectual property in
73
any widely accepted international agreement. Additionally, there have
been initiatives to protect matter that might otherwise not clearly meet
the criteria for protection. The WIPO Copyright Treaty, for example,
74
expressly requires protection for compilations of data.
Given this historical and political context, it may appear beneficial to
traditional knowledge holders to broaden the classic justifications of
intellectual property law in order to include traditional knowledge and
75
“poor people’s knowledge.” However, it is important to remember
that many developing countries have objected to the global reach of
intellectual property rights for various legitimate reasons. These include
factors such as the increased cost and the reduced accessibility of goods,
ranging from HIV medications to educational materials that are
76
protected by intellectual property rights. Further, it has yet to be
conclusively shown that intellectual property rights actually stimulate
77
With this in mind, any new intellectual
economic development.
73. For example, the inclusion of geographical indications in TRIPS represented the
first time that this subject matter was acknowledged in a global agreement as a category of
intellectual property. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at arts. 22, 23. Indications of
sources were recognized in the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin
and their International Registration, 923 U.N.T.S. 205 (1958). However, this agreement has
only 27 signatories. See Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and
their
International
Registration:
Objective
and
Main
Features,
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/lisbon/en/general (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
74. WIPO: Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, art. 5 (1997). This is
because compilations of data would not necessarily be able to recieve copyright protection
due to the requirement that there be some minimal creativity.
75. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 123–124 (2007).
76. J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with
the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES J. INT’L L. 441, 450–51 (Summer 2000) (noting
developing country concerns about the costs associated with IP protection, including issues
such as access to medicines); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright
and Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803 (2007); DUTFIELD &
SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 9 (Edward Elgar, 2008)
(observing that intellectual property rights generally result in increased prices and a reduced
access to knowledge).
77. Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV 130, 132, 166 (2009); see Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual
Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46
HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1116–1118 (2009) (discussing how various nations attained high levels of
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property right should be carefully contemplated and adequately
justified, taking into consideration a balancing of rights and
78
obligations.
Developing countries, seeing enhanced intellectual property laws as
ill-suited to their levels of economic development, sought more relaxed
intellectual property standards than those which were ultimately
79
implemented in TRIPS.
Given that the contours of traditional
knowledge are not well-defined, developing countries may be
overconfident in the assumption that a sui generis traditional knowledge
right will benefit them in the way that intellectual property rights have
benefited some parts of the industrialized world. A sui generis
intellectual property model to protect traditional knowledge will not
eliminate the need to enforce and protect existing intellectual property
rights. Nor will the problems of the current intellectual property system
be corrected through the creation of a new right. Moreover, it may
result in increased costs, including the need to pay to access the
previously free cultural goods of others.
E. Reaching Agreement on an International Legal Instrument to Protect
Traditional Knowledge
Reaching an agreement on the text of an international legal
instrument to protect traditional knowledge is no small task. In this
section of the paper, I will outline the WIPO mandate and progress on

economic growth without having strong intellectual property rights); see GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO
QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 27 (2010)
(observing that despite significant efforts, it is difficult, to quantify the net effect of
counterfeiting and piracy on the economy). But see Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Law as
Stimulus: The Role of Law in Fostering Innovative Entrepreneurship, 6 J. L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 153, 166–68 (2010) (arguing that the patent system overall tends to benefit
entrepreneurs). See Rod Falvey, Neil Foster & David Greenaway, Intellectual Property
Rights and Economic Growth, in INTERNATIONALISATION OF ECONOMIC POLICY 7–9
(2004) (showing a positive relationship between intellectual property protection and
economic growth); see, e.g., Walter G. Park & Juan Carlos Ginarte, Intellectual Property
Rights and Economic Growth, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 51 (1997) (stating that intellectual
property rights indirectly affect economic growth).
78. See Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights
Protection: A Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A
TRIPS-PLUS ERA, 115, 118, 140–41 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2007).
79. Adebambo Adewopo, The Global Intellectual Property System and Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Prognostic Reflection, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 749, 754–69 (2002); CARLOS CORREA,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (2000)
(discussing how industrialized countries only sought strong intellectual property rights once
they had attained a certain level of industrialization and economic development).
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traditional knowledge discussions, including the apparent tensions
between developing and developed countries.
WIPO’s work on traditional knowledge began in 1998 with two
roundtable discussions and nine fact-finding missions on traditional
80
knowledge, innovation, and creativity. The most recent WIPO IGC
mandate, which was agreed upon by a consensus decision of the 184
WIPO member states, is a strong indication that some progress will be
81
made on the international protection of traditional knowledge. The
IGC is tasked with reaching agreement on the text of an international
legal instrument to protect genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and
traditional cultural expressions. The text is to be submitted to the
82
The WIPO IGC held its first
WIPO General Assembly by 2011.
83
meeting under the new mandate in early December, 2009.
However, the discussions on this issue have been slow and difficult,
with many national delegations expressing frustration at the lack of
progress in creating an international framework for the protection of
84
such knowledge. This appears to be primarily due to substantial lack
of agreement on the need to protect traditional knowledge, and
perhaps, on the utility of addressing the concerns of traditional

80. WIPO, MATTERS CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE—AN OVERVIEW ¶¶ 29–30
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3 (2001). WIPO’s involvement on expressions of folklore
dates back to its 1978 work with UNESCO on model provisions for national laws to protect
folklore; WIPO IGC, MATTERS CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE 3, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/26/6
(2000).
81. See WIPO, IGC RESUMES SUBSTANTIVE WORK, WIPO Doc. PR/2009/625 (2009),
available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2009/article_0058.html.
82. WIPO IGC, MATTERS CONCERNING THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
AND FOLKLORE, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/38/9 (2009). The text is to be based on existing WIPO
documents, with three documents to provide the basis for the committee’s work:
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/8A (Traditional
Cultural Expressions, Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources). According the
schedule included in the mandate, the WIPO General Assembly meeting is to take place in
September 2011.
83. WIPO, IGC RESUMES SUBSTANTIVE WORK, WIPO Doc. PR/2009/625 (2009),
available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2009/article _0058.html (after the first
meeting, further discussion on the composition of inter-sessional working groups, their
mandates, and various related matters was still required); WIPO, WIPO MEMBER STATES
ADVANCE WORK ON TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, FOLKLORE AND GENETIC RESOURCES,
WIPO
Doc.
PR/2010/639
(2010),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2010/article_0012.html (update showing IGC
progress).
84. WIPO IGC, REPORT ¶¶ 13, 19, 22-29, 32, 34, 37, 38, 42, 242, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009).
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knowledge holders by creating new legal rights.
Developing countries tend to support traditional knowledge
protection while the industrialized countries are more hesitant. For
instance, in its response to a 2007 WIPO questionnaire, the United
States conveyed its reluctance to move forward on international legal
85
protection for traditional knowledge. The United States expressed the
view that it was premature to discuss various matters relating to the
protection of traditional knowledge. These included the term of
protection, possible limitations and exceptions, and sanctions and
86
penalties. In contrast, the Bandung Declaration of the New Asian
African Strategic Partnership submitted to WIPO that same year by
Indonesia stresses the “urgent need to expedite the establishment of
international legally binding instruments” to protect traditional
87
knowledge, including sui generis mechanisms.
In an attempt to breach the apparent impasse, the African Group
th
88
submitted a proposal to the 14 session of the WIPO IGC. In this June
2009 proposal, the African Group seeks a legally binding international
instrument for the protection of traditional knowledge. The proposal
summarizes the general positions of the WIPO member States,
categorizes them into groups and then provides the African Group’s
89
The summary reflects the lack of
suggestion for moving forward.
consensus on matters ranging from the definition of traditional
knowledge, to issues such as whom should be the beneficiaries of any
such protection and whether there is actually a need for an international
90
regime to protect this subject matter. This underscores the need for a
solid policy rationale for its protection, and one that makes sense in
respect of intangible goods.
85. The United States is seen as one of the primary opponents to an international
regime to protect TK. See Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition
Agreements as a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in
the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629, 683–86 (2007).
86. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS/EXPRESSIONS OF
FOLKLORE AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
5–7,
12–4
(2007),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/igc/pdf/usa_tk-tce.pdf (responses to Questions 5,
6, and 8).
87. WIPO, BANDUNG DECLARATION ON THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 8,
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/12 (2007) (submitted by Indonesia).
88. WIPO, AFRICAN GROUP SUBMISSION ON WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/14/9 (2009).
89. Id. at Annex I, page 1.
90. WIPO, AFRICAN GROUP SUBMISSION ON WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/14/9 (2009).
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II. JUSTIFYING INTANGIBLE PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Classic Approaches to Intellectual Property Law
Unlike physical property, the boundaries of abstract objects are
exclusively determined by the law that creates property rights in
intangible goods. Thus, such property rights create exclusivity where
none would otherwise exist. As intangible goods, intellectual creations
91
are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
Intellectual property is
considered a public good because it is not diminished by additional
92
uses. It is therefore important to have a solid policy rationale for any
legal regime that creates property in intangible goods. I will briefly
outline the main justifications for intellectual property rights, which can
be described as natural rights theories and utilitarian or incentive
93
theories.
According to natural rights theory, the creator deserves protection
for his intellectual creations because he has mixed his labor with what
previously belonged to the commons and is therefore entitled to his just
94
desserts. Utilitarian justifications for intellectual property protection
tend to be based on the goal of promoting economic efficiency, or
providing incentives for innovation despite the costs that may be
associated with creating new products. This is particularly true for
95
industrial property.
91. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 32 (2004); CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE NEW ENCLOSURES 3–4 (2d ed. 2010).
92. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13–14 (2003).
93. The relatively new “social planning theory” approach to IPRs has as its underlying
idea the need for intellectual property protection to be part of planned attempt to create rules
that “advance a vision of a just and attractive culture.” See, eg., William Fisher, Theories of
Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY
175 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
94. See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 28–29 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009)
(discussing natural rights theory). Another natural rights approach, more closely associated
with civil law systems, treats intellectual property as a type of moral right linked to the
creator’s personhood. Moral rights theory tends to be more commonly used to justify
copyright protection. For example, international copyright law recognizes the author’s moral
right to have the work attributed to her and not to have the work altered without consent.
See WIPO, BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS, art. 6 bis (Paris Act of July 24, 1971 as am. Sept. 28, 1979) (1886) [hereinafter Berne
Convention]; Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C, §106A (2006) (limited moral rights
provision for intentional or grossly negligent destruction of a visual artwork).
95. Trademarks, for example, are thought to help consumers make more economically
efficient choices by relying on the marks to distinguish the source of goods. Trademark laws
serve the public good insofar as they reduce confusion and misleading practices in the market
place. They also encourage the production of high quality products to be used in association
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It has been suggested that the utilitarian justification of providing
incentives for innovation is, though not perfect, perhaps the strongest
96
justification for intellectual property rights. Society agrees to protect
certain intangible goods not only for the benefit of the producers but
also for the benefit of the users and the public in general. Intellectual
property rights are part of a social contract—an exchange between the
97
inventor or creator and the public. This is a good starting point from
which to assess intellectual property law in terms of its public purpose,
but it has its limitations. The modern discourse on intellectual property
often focuses on innovation and creativity as the utilitarian goals of
98
intellectual property policy. Unfortunately, the other social benefits
99
that intellectual property law should generate tend to be overlooked.
It is useful to go beyond a predominantly economic focused utilitarian
approach in order to create space for the consideration of other goals,
100
such as access to affordable knowledge goods.
B. An Instrumentalist Approach
Property rights in intangible goods can affect the distribution of

with the mark. Patents, for example, provide an incentive for commercializing new
inventions to compensate for the costs involved in developing and bringing a new product to
the market. Moreover, they decrease secrecy and increase the pool of knowledge that is
available to society. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003). Patenting requires that the
invention be disclosed such that a skilled third party could reproduce the invention, thereby
leading to the dissemination of knowledge. Patents can thus be said to curtail the desire to
keep inventions secret. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 29.1; U.S. Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. §111, 112 (requiring that the patent application contain a specification, with a written
description of the invention, as well as an explanation of how to make and use the invention
“in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains . . . to make and use the same”).
96. Edward C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, 31, 47–48 (Winter 1989).
97. See, e.g., JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 30–31 (Vicki Been et. al. eds., 3d ed.
2009). Though this explanation is often used to explain patent law, it is applicable to other
forms of intellectual property as well.
98. Professor Long suggests that, though intellectual property has been justified on the
basis of natural law, labor theory, and personality theory, the TRIPS Agreement has
established the theory of utilitarianism, and trade utilitarianism in particular, as the single
international philosophy of intellectual property rights.
See Doris Estelle Long,
“Democratizing” Globalization: Practicing the Policies of Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 243 (2002).
99. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2831 (2006) (observing that there has been a focus on the wealth
maximizing function of intellectual property).
100. Id. at 2823, 2858 (suggesting that intellectual property should be responsive to
development paradigms and advocating a principle of substantive equality).
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power in favor of the rights holders. This is because certain abstract
objects relate to physical or knowledge resources upon which many may
102
depend.
The push to protect traditional knowledge can be
characterized, in part, as a response to the perceived unequal
103
This is largely due to the expansion of
distribution of power.
developed country standards for intellectual property protection for all
104
countries without regard to their differing levels of development. The
traditional knowledge narrative appears to be partly driven by a desire
for a more equitable international intellectual property system, one that
is seen to value the contributions of both the developed and the
105
developing world.
Professor Drahos proposes an instrumentalist approach to
intellectual property, which considers the social costs of intellectual
106
property protection.
He characterizes intellectual property rights as
“liberty-intruding privileges of a special kind,” which can lead to
107
factionalism and to a concentration of private power. It follows that if
intellectual property is considered from a distributive justice
108
perspective, the scope of these rights should be limited. This approach
strives to achieve more than a simple cost-benefit analysis and conceives

101. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 158–59 (1996);
CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE NEW ENCLOSURES 68 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining that there is a disparity in
power between the owners of intellectual property and the social groups who may benefit
from more openness).
102. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 158–59 (1996).
Examples include resources such as seeds, genes, forms of medical treatment, and chemical
compounds.
103. David Castle & E. Richard Gold, Traditional Knowledge and Benefit Sharing:
From Compensation to Transaction, in ACCESSING AND SHARING THE BENEFITS OF THE
GENOMICS REVOLUTION 65, 67 (Peter W.B. Phillips & Chika B. Onwuekwe eds., 2007);
David Skillman & Christopher Ledford, Limiting the Commons with Uncommon Property: A
Critique of Chander & Sunder’s “The Romance of the Public Domain,” 8 OR. REV. INT’L L.
337, 340–41, 347 (2006).
104. David Skillman & Christopher Ledford, Limiting the Commons with Uncommon
Property: A Critique of Chander & Sunder’s “The Romance of the Public Domain,” 8 OR.
REV. INT’L L. 337, 340–41, 347 (2006).
105. David Castle & E. Richard Gold, Traditional Knowledge and Benefit Sharing:
From Compensation to Transaction, in ACCESSING AND SHARING THE BENEFITS OF THE
GENOMICS REVOLUTION 65, 67 (Peter W.B. Phillips & Chika B. Onwuekwe eds., 2007).
106. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 213–214, 223
(1996).
107. Id. at 5.
108. Indeed, rather than viewing intellectual property law as creating rights, Professor
Drahos suggests that the narrative should shift to intellectual property law as granting
privileges, that are accompanied by corresponding duties. See id. at 200.
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of intellectual property as a means to an end.
Utilizing this model,
intellectual property law would be developed with a view to achieving
objectives that are based on some moral value. Though instrumentalism
is not linked to any particular moral value, its humanist orientation
110
would lead to a consideration of distributive justice theories.
If the traditional knowledge dialogue is partially a response to the
deleterious effects of TRIPS, then a distributive justice analysis of
traditional knowledge may be relevant to the traditional knowledge
narrative. Treating intellectual property as a means to an end, one
might ask whether a traditional knowledge right will achieve the goal of
more equity, or, for the purposes of this paper, whether it will result in
access to affordable knowledge goods. Global intellectual property law
has been criticized as reflecting a top-down approach to intellectual
property regulation and one that is based on the needs and objectives of
111
wealthy states. Asking whether a traditional knowledge right supports
a particular equity oriented outcome serves as a useful framework for
analyzing property rights in intangible goods. It also allows for a
consideration of some of the concerns of developing countries,
knowledge users, and the poor.
From a development perspective, Professor Chon suggests that a
distributive justice approach, which focuses on the needs of users in
both developed and developing countries for accessible and affordable
112
knowledge goods may respond to the imbalance in the global regime.
As Professor Chon points out, distributive justice can be approached
from an economic perspective or a political perspective. It may also
involve a consideration of the relationship between the production of
knowledge goods and other social goods such as public health or
113
education. On the global scale, this may lead one to query how best to
ensure the intellectual property balance such that the inequities of the
114
global trading system are not exacerbated.
1. The International Treaties Support a Balanced Approach
Given the international nature of the traditional knowledge debate,
some consideration should be given to the global view of intellectual
109. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 213–214, 223
(1996).
110. Id. at 214–215.
111. Id. at 805.
112. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability for
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 805, 813 (2007).
113. Id. at 809.
114. Id. at 810.
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property rights as reflected by the major multilateral intellectual
property agreements. Although they are always born of compromise,
the treaties represent the best approximation of the collective views of
the states that have endorsed them.
The language of the international treaties, which reflects the need to
balance the rights of users and producers, supports a distributive justice
approach to international intellectual property law. The balancing
function of the intellectual property regime may be characterized as a
question of distributive justice because it requires a consideration of
which social group is entitled to intellectual property protected
115
knowledge goods.
The Berne Convention and the Paris Convention,
for example, contain various limitations and exceptions to intellectual
property rights to prevent the abuse of the limited monopoly and to
116
allow users to access the work even if it is subject to property rights.
Similarly, TRIPS provides for limited exceptions to the rights conferred
117
by copyright, patent, and trademark. These provisions aim to ensure
not only that the public domain is enhanced, but also that intellectual
118
property law contributes to the social and economic needs of society.
115. Id. at 806.
116. See e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5A(2),
5C(1) (1883) [hereinafter Paris Convention] (Article 5A(2) allows for the compulsory
licensing of patents under certain circumstances and Article 5C(1) of the Paris Convention
allows countries to cancel the registration of a mark if it goes unused without any reasonable
justification on the part of the right holder. Article 5A(2) provides that “[e]ach country of
the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of
compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the
exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.” Article 5C(1) states
that “[i]f, in any country, use of the registered mark is compulsory, the registration may be
cancelled only after a reasonable period, and then only if the person concerned does not
justify his inaction.” In copyright law, Article 9 of the Berne Convention allows Berne
members to provide in their national laws for the reproduction of protected works “in certain
special cases,” on the condition that the reproduction “does not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.”).
117. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 30, provides for limited exceptions to the
patent right, art. 17 provides for limited exception to the rights conferred by trademark, and
art. 13 provides for limited exceptions to the rights conferred by copyright.
118. The term “public domain” as used in this article refers to works that are not
subject to intellectual property rights. Works that are protected under intellectual property
law but subject to certain limited exceptions to the rights conferred would not, in the context
of this piece, be considered works in the “public domain.” I recognize that some eminent
scholars, such as Professor Boyle, use the term “public domain” to encompass those areas of
free access within intellectual property law. See James Boyle, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ENCLOSING OF THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 38–39 (2008). The aspects of traditional
knowledge that are currently debated are those that fall within the public domain insofar as
they are not subject to intellectual property rights at all. Thus, I discuss the exceptions to
intellectual property rights as an element of the balancing function of intellectual property
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Even more pertinent to the discussion about excluded subject
matter, is the international recognition that not all forms of knowledge
should fall within the ambit of intellectual property law. For instance,
TRIPS enshrines the established principle that copyright law extends to
119
the expression of an idea, but not to the idea itself.
Further, with a
view to protecting public health and morality, WTO members may
exclude diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods from
120
patentability.
Additionally, the policy objective of curtailing
monopolies on language means that generic words are not protectable
121
as trademarks.
In other words, there may be policy reasons for
preventing some types of knowledge from being subject to property
rights.
Finally, TRIPS, which incorporates by reference the main provisions
of the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention, explicitly
acknowledges in Articles 7 and 8 the importance of a balanced
122
intellectual property regime. Article 7 states:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to
123
a balance of rights and obligations [emphasis added].
This is consistent with a distributive justice analysis of intellectual
property law as well as with the notion that intellectual property policy
124
should serve some broader public good.
The arguments about equity and fairness that are raised in the
context of the traditional knowledge narrative reinforce the need to
take the distributive justice aspects of intellectual property policy into
account in determining the appropriate model for the protection of
policy rather than as part of the public domain.
119. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 9.2. Procedures, methods of operation,
and mathematical concepts are also excluded from protection.
120. Id. at art. 27.3. In addition, art. 27.2 of TRIPS allows WTO members to exclude
certain inventions from patentability in order to protect public health and morality.
121. Id. at art. 15–17; Paris Convention, supra note 116, at art. 6 quinquies.
122. Article 8 of TRIPS incorporates the flexibility for WTO member states to
implement measures to protect public health and to “promote the public interest in sectors of
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development.”
TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 8.
123. Id. at art. 7.
124. See Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS.
L. REV. 979 (2009).
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traditional knowledge.
III. A TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE RIGHT
A. The Objectives of Traditional Knowledge Protection
This section of the paper compares the objectives and rationale for
traditional knowledge protection to those for intellectual property. In
so doing, the aim is to consider whether, given some of the stated
objectives for traditional knowledge protection, an intellectual property
model is suitable. Some commentators view a sui generis intellectual
125
Others have suggested that it may
property regime as a necessity.
make sense for traditional knowledge to be protected as intellectual
126
property due to broad similarities between the two.
The view that this knowledge should be treated as intellectual
property is reflected in public statements made by certain indigenous
groups. For example, the 1993 Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and
127
Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples reaffirmed the
undertaking of United Nations Member States to “[a]dopt or strengthen
appropriate policies and/or legal instruments that will protect
indigenous intellectual and cultural property and the right to preserve
128
customary and administrative systems and practices . . . .”
Similarly,
129
the 1992 Indigenous Peoples Earth Charter contains various provisions
on traditional knowledge, including a statement indicating that it should
be considered a crime to usurp traditional knowledge and medicines,
and a request that “our right to intellectual and cultural properties be
guaranteed and that the mechanism for its implementation be in favor
130
of our peoples, and studied in depth and implemented.”
125. Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade, and Sustainable Development, 19 Colo. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 219, 249–52 (Summer 2008).
126. Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81
TEMP. L. REV. 433, 448–53 (Summer 2008).
127. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMM’N OF PREVENTION OF
DISCRIMINATION AND PROT. OF MINORITIES WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS, THE MATAATUA DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1993). The conference was convened by the
Nine Tribes of the Mataatua in New Zealand and attended by more than 140 delegates from
fourteen countries.
128. Id. at 1.
129. Kari-oca Conference, Appendix 5 (May 25–30, 1992) [hereinafter IPEC].
130. Id. ¶¶ 99, 102. Other traditional knowledge related statements can be found in
paragraphs 28 and 96 of the IPEC. With respect to the criminalization of the taking of
traditional knowledge, the notion that the illegal taking should be considered a crime is not a
concept that is foreign to intellectual property law. Indeed, TRIPS, Article 61 requires the
criminalization of trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy that takes place “on a
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The WIPO draft provisions on traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions consist of general principles and objectives. A
review of the draft provisions reveals that the international community
is yet to address traditional knowledge protection in a specific and
definitive way. However, since one of the options is to treat it as a new
form of intellectual property, I will next discuss the areas where the
goals of traditional knowledge and intellectual property may overlap
and where they may diverge or conflict.
1. Commonality between the Policy Objectives of Intellectual Property
and Traditional Knowledge
I identify the right to exclude others, economic incentives, and
innovation as three potentially shared objectives of traditional
knowledge and intellectual property.
a. Exclusion
Intellectual property rights prevent others from making use of the
protected creation without the consent of the right holder. This is
similar to the protection sought for traditional knowledge insofar as
traditional knowledge holders seek to prevent others from making use
131
of their intangible goods without consent. However, because the right
holder is clearly identified in the intellectual property context, the
excluded other is also well defined. In the traditional knowledge
context, it may not be clear precisely whom is the “other” to be
132
excluded.
This is because the boundaries of the category for
133
traditional knowledge holder are amorphous.
b. Economic Rationale
Some traditional knowledge holders may be opposed to
commercializing goods that have been created from the use of
traditional knowledge and genetic resources because they consider it
134
sacred.
Thus, even if permission were sought to use the traditional
commercial scale.”
131. Among the objectives of traditional knowledge protection is the requirement for
prior informed consent. See infra note 140.
132. See the discussion of “indigenous person” at section III (B) of the paper.
133. Indeed, it may not be possible to create clear boundaries, particularly if, as
discussed in the paper, not all indigenous persons are traditional, and not all traditional
persons are indigenous.
134. Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81
TEMP. L. REV. 433, 455 (Summer 2008); WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF SHAMANS ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 2, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001).
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knowledge, it may well be refused.
Still, not all traditional knowledge would fall into this category.
According to the Mataatua Declaration, for example, indigenous
peoples should be the sole owners of their cultural and intellectual
136
property. However, they are willing to share this knowledge as long as
137
Some traditional knowledge
they can define and control its use.
holders have expressed the view that they should be entitled to any
patent rights arising from the use of their knowledge, as well as the
138
ability to prevent any unauthorized taking of their genetic resources.
Thus, protecting traditional knowledge does not necessarily imply that
such knowledge could not be utilized in commercial channels, provided
the traditional knowledge producing communities could exercise control
over its use.
Equitable benefit sharing is another goal that reflects the economic
139
objectives of traditional knowledge protection.
The objective is to
135. Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81
TEMP. L. REV. 433, 457 (Summer 2008); WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF SHAMANS ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 2, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001).
136. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMM’N OF PREVENTION OF
DISCRIMINATION AND PROT. OF MINORITIES WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS, THE MATAATUA DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1–2 (1993) (declaring that “Indigenous
Peoples of the world have the right to self determination and in exercising that right must be
recognised as the exclusive owners Of their cultural and intellectual property . . . .”).
137. See, e.g., COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMM’N OF PREVENTION OF
DISCRIMINATION AND PROT. OF MINORITIES WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS, THE MATAATUA DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1–2 (1993); (recognizing that “Indigenous
Peoples are capable of managing their traditional knowledge themselves, but are willing to
offer it to all humanity provided their fundamental rights to define and control this
knowledge are protected by the international community . . . .”).
138. WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF SHAMANS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶¶ 7, 15, WIPO
Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001).
139. WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: REVISED
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5 (2006). This is one of the
documents that will serve as the basis of discussion for an international instrument to protect
traditional knowledge. The enumerated policy objectives are as follows: recognize value,
promote respect, meet the actual needs of traditional knowledge holder, promote
conservation and preservation of traditional knowledge, empower holders of traditional
knowledge and acknowledge the distinctive nature traditional knowledge systems, support
traditional knowledge systems, contribute to safeguarding traditional knowledge, repress
unfair and inequitable uses, concord with relevant international agreements and processes,
promote innovation and creativity, ensure prior informed consent and exchanges based on
mutually agreed terms, promote equitable benefit-sharing, promote community development
and legitimate trading activities, preclude the grant of improper intellectual property rights to
unauthorized parties, enhance transparency and mutual confidence, and complement
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“promote the fair and equitable sharing and distribution of monetary
and non-monetary benefits arising from the use of traditional
140
knowledge.”
In addition to the objectives outlined by WIPO, the language in
international instruments, such as the Convention on Biological
Diversity (“CBD”) and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources provide further evidence that there is some interest in
commercializing traditional knowledge, or at least sharing in the
141
economic benefits derived therefrom. For example, the CBD Article
8(1)(j) encourages an “equitable sharing of the benefits” arising from
142
the use of traditional knowledge. Article 15(5) of the CBD requires
State parties to obtain prior informed consent before accessing genetic
143
The wide support for these treaties, as evidenced by the
resources.
number of signatories, suggests that there are a significant number of
nations whose indigenous stake-holders support the idea of prior
informed consent and equitable benefit sharing if a product based on
traditional knowledge is commercialized.
It seems reasonable to conclude therefore that part of the policy
rationale underlying the protection of traditional knowledge is
commercial. Traditional knowledge is said to play an important role in
protection of traditional cultural expressions.
140. Id. at 4. A closely related objective of traditional knowledge protection is to
ensure that prior informed consent for the use of the knowledge is obtained on mutually
agreed terms. See id.
141. Convention on Biological Diversity (with annexes), concluded at Rio de Janeiro
on June 5, 1992, [hereinafter CBD] 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992) (as of this writing, the
United
States
has
signed
but
not
ratified
the
CBD),
available
at
http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/. The Preamble of the CBD expressly recognizes
“the close and traditional dependence of many indigenous and local communities embodying
traditional lifestyles on biological resources, and the desirability of sharing equitably benefits
arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices . . . .”; Food and
Agricultural Organization, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, (2002) [hereinafter ITPGR] (as of this writing, the United States has signed but
not ratified the ITPGR), available at http://www.fao.org/legal/treaties/033s-e.htm. The CBD
and the ITGPR have provisions relating to intellectual property rights, traditional knowledge
and access to genetic materials.
142. CBD, supra note 141, at art. 8(j) provides: “Subject to its national legislation,
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and
involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations
and practices.”
143. Id. at art. 15(5) provides: “Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior
informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise
determined by that Party.”
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the global economy, with the market value of plant-based medicines
144
sold in developed countries estimated to be worth billions. Also, some
indigenous groups may view their traditional knowledge as private
145
property that is capable of commercialization. Thus, the commercial
nature of intellectual property law is not necessarily incompatible with
traditional knowledge protection.
Despite this common commercial aspect, the economic objective of
traditional knowledge is related to the sharing of benefits from the
commercialization of such knowledge rather than as a way to recoup the
costs associated with commercialization. The traditional knowledge
objective of equitable benefit sharing would be consistent with a
development-focused distributive justice approach to intellectual
property. This would move away from the main distributive economic
aspect of classical intellectual property law, which aims to distribute the
146
costs of innovation and commercialization. This classical intellectual
property economic distribution serves to create incentives for
innovation. By comparison, traditional knowledge aims to achieve a
more equitable outcome in the sense that the benefits arising from the
use and commercialization of the property are shared. Thus, the
underlying economic policy justifications remain somewhat distinct
from one another. This emphasizes the importance of the equity
seeking distributive justice elements to traditional knowledge.
c. Innovation
One could list innovation as another shared policy objective of
intellectual property rights and a traditional knowledge right.
Intellectual property policy aims to stimulate innovation, and thereby
the development of new intangible goods. Traditional knowledge
protection is also supposed to promote innovation and creativity and to
enhance the transmission of traditional knowledge within indigenous
147
and traditional communities.
At the same time, the innovation intellectual property seeks to

144. Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 243–44 (Spring 2001).
145. See id. (noting that the market valued of plant based medicines was estimated to
be $61 billion in 1990).
146. Margaret Chon, Distributive Justice and Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property
“from Below”: Copyright and Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 808
(2007) (noting that from an economic perspective, distributive justice may require the
allocation of resources among social groups).
147. WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: REVISED
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 4, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5 (2006).
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promote and the innovative aspects of traditional knowledge differ in
some respects. Traditional knowledge is described as innovative insofar
148
as it is constantly evolving in response to a changing environment.
This responsive evolution could be described as adaptive rather than
innovative. Intellectual property seeks to incentivize innovations and
creations that are new or independently created, even though they may
149
build upon the prior works of others.
Admittedly, most patents are
granted on minor improvements and copyright law does not require that
a work be innovative, only that it be original. This supports the position
that traditional knowledge is no less innovative than patentable or
copyrightable subject matter. Yet, it is precisely because some
traditional knowledge could not meet the requirements for intellectual
property protection that a sui generis right has been proposed. It seems
reasonable to conclude therefore, that innovation may be a partially
shared objective, but that the concept of innovation in the traditional
knowledge context is broader than in intellectual property law. Thus,
the threshold for innovation in the traditional knowledge context may
be lower.
2. Equity-Oriented Goals as a Major Distinction
The fairness aspect of the traditional knowledge narrative
underscores the distinction between the aims of intellectual property
and traditional knowledge.
Traditional knowledge has been
characterized as representing intangible developing country goods while
150
intellectual property protects intangible developed country goods.
Part of the logic underlying the argument in favor of an intellectual
property type protection for traditional knowledge is that if the
developed countries can protect their intangible goods, commercialize
them and benefit economically, developing countries should be entitled
to the same treatment for their intangible goods. This may help explain
why some traditional knowledge proponents seek a sui generis regime
for what some describe as intellectual property in traditional
151
knowledge.
148. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: OPERATIONAL TERMS AND
DEFINITIONS 11, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9 (2002).
149. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra
note 166.
150. Id.; see Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 112 (Spring 2007).
151. WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF SHAMANS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 15, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001); UNESCO Symposium on the protection of traditional
knowledge and expressions of indigenous cultures in the Pacific Islands, Noumea, 15-19
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Intellectual property seeks to promote the creation of new works to
enrich the public domain. It also strives, through various exceptions, to
maintain a balance between the rights of the user and the rights of the
creator. By comparison, it seems that traditional knowledge advocates
seek to protect the rights of traditional and indigenous communities
essentially for reasons of equity. This may be because the problems of
“bio-piracy” and misappropriation of traditional knowledge are not
really about intellectual property per se. Rather, the debate seems to
be, in large part, about the effects of a strong intellectual property
regime in situations where there is a marked inequality of bargaining
power. This can be characterized as a problem of commercial entities,
academic institutions, or individuals taking advantage of and exploiting
those who are less resourced or lack knowledge about the intellectual
152
property regime. This is about the dynamics of power.
Generally speaking, the persons said to be traditional knowledge
holders are in a relatively weak position compared to those who tend to
153
be able to obtain intellectual property rights.
This may be due to
differences in economic status, education, or knowledge about the
intellectual property system. That said, would protecting traditional
knowledge through a sui generis intangible property right create a more
equitable, from a distributive justice perspective, intellectual property
regime? What would be the public service function of an intangible
property right in traditional knowledge? It has been posited that the
protection of traditional knowledge serves the greater good because
traditional knowledge holders will continue to innovate and that there is
a strong link to the preservation of the environment, both physical and
154
cultural.

February
1999
Final
Declaration,
UNESCO,
available
at
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/14264/10645002355Noumea1999.pdf/Noumea1999.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
152. See, e.g., Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 271 (Spring 2001) (observing that patent law tends to favor
corporate interests, even when it is to the detriment of traditional peoples); See Letter From
David Hirschmann, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Global Intellectual Property Center of
the United States Chamber of Commerce, To the President of the United States (Feb. 16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/sites/default/files/documents/adminletter.pdf (last visited
May 10, 2010) (outlining the Chamber of Commerce agenda for the promotion and
protection of American intellectual property rights through increased vigilance and
enforcement activities).
153. Consider, for example, the intellectual property resources and economic resources
of a small African ethnic group, such as the San people located in South Africa as compared
to the resources of a research institution or a pharmaceutical company.
154. See generally Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW
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However, as part of this equity-oriented discourse, the traditional
155
knowledge right appears to be contemplated as a kind of natural right.
A focus on intangible property as a kind of natural right, deriving from
Locke’s labor theory, can result in an imbalanced intellectual property
system. This is because intellectual property, as a natural right, achieves
156
a status that allows it to take priority over other competing interests.
Thus, the use of an intellectual property model to protect traditional
knowledge may not be consistent with the delicate balance that
intellectual property law seeks to achieve. Ultimately, this could be
detrimental not only to the broader public but also to the traditional
knowledge holders themselves.
Yet, it should be possible to have an international intellectual
property system that does not enable sophisticated, complex users of
intellectual property laws to take advantage of indigenous and local
communities or others who could be considered to be in a position of
relative disadvantage. This objective should be feasible without creating
new intangible property rights. Instead of creating more intellectual
property rights, it may be more effective to take an instrumentalist
approach to intellectual property—one that aims to attain certain social
goods. Among these could be a more equitable human developmentoriented interaction between intellectual property law and less
157
resourced persons.
Two examples of the equity seeking objectives of a traditional
knowledge right are the protection of cultural heritage and the
promotion of value and respect.
a. Protecting Cultural Heritage
It is not surprising that intellectual property law is inadequate to
protect all forms of traditional knowledge. Although some intangible
cultural goods can be protected under intellectual property law, and
copyright law in particular, the protection of intangible cultural goods
and classical intellectual property have different objectives and serve
158
fundamentally different purposes.
One seeks to protect cultural
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (Spring 2007).
155. I say this in the sense that traditional knowledge seems to be heavily influenced by
the human rights-related concerns of traditional knowledge holders.
156. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 200–01 (1996).
157. I use the term “disadvantaged person” to refer to those who are disadvantaged in
relation to the intellectual property system either due to economics, education, or for
historical or cultural reasons.
158. Since copyright protects literary artistic works, it could be said to protect
intangible cultural goods to the extent that these creations are considered cultural property.
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heritage, while the other seeks to promote creativity, innovation,
159
Control over cultural goods,
efficiency and commercialization.
heritage, and expressions is not considered to be the primary objective
160
of intellectual property protection.
Rather, at this time, the
predominant rationale for intellectual property rights is to stimulate
innovation and creativity.
b. Promoting Value and Respect
Policy objectives for the protection of traditional knowledge include
aims such as recognizing the value of traditional knowledge and
161
In addition, traditional
promoting respect for such knowledge.
knowledge holders aim to repress unfair and inequitable uses, safeguard
162
It is
the knowledge, and promote community development.
immediately apparent that some of the objectives of traditional
knowledge protection are based on a desire to promote respect for the
traditional knowledge source communities and the development of such
communities.
However, creating property rights in traditional
knowledge is not necessarily essential to recognizing its social value.
Indeed, some of the most valuable knowledge cannot receive
163
intellectual property protection, precisely because of its value.
Similar value promoting objectives are found in the 2003 UNESCO
International Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural
164
Heritage (“UNESCO Convention”) and were likely carried over into
For example, certain cultural songs, paintings, or books may be subject to copyright
protection. Geographical indications may be a form of intellectual property that can be used
to protect elements of culture.
159. Various scholars have observed the inconsistency between the objective of
protecting cultural property and the goals of intellectual property policy. See SUSAN
SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN
LAW 17–19 (2005) (stating that the utilitarian policy objective of enriching the public domain
is among the greatest barriers to the protection of cultural products); Christine H. Farley,
Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L.
REV. 1, 55 (1997) (pointing out that, with respect to copyright law, what some traditional
knowledge advocates seek is contrary to the goal of disseminating of information that
copyright law seeks to encourage, and that it runs the risk of diminishing the public domain).
160. Whether intellectual property law has slowly been taking on a new role may be
worthy of further consideration. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the
Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 810, 816–17 (2010) (arguing that intellectual property
rights are increasingly used as an indication of authenticity).
161. WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: REVISED
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 3, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5 (2006).
162. Id. at 4.
163. For example, scientific theorems and mathematical principles are not patentable.
164. U.N. EDUC. SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), Convention for the
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003) (signed by 118 states as if December
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the WIPO forum from there. The definition of intangible cultural
heritage is similar to that of traditional knowledge and would appear to
165
cover much of the same subject matter.
The preamble to the
UNESCO Convention refers to certain international instruments,
166
including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. It goes on to
recognize the importance of safeguarding the “intangible common
heritage of humanity” and notes the absence of a binding multilateral
agreement to protect intangible cultural heritage.
The UNESCO Convention requires State parties to take measures to
safeguard intangible cultural heritage within their territories, and
establishes policy and educational commitments for the State parties to
167
undertake in order to do so. However, it does not establish specific
legal mechanisms for the protection of this heritage. Further, Article 3
of the UNESCO Convention provides that it should not be interpreted
as affecting any rights or obligations under any international intellectual
168
property conventions. By comparison, WIPO has the task of creating
169
effective legal protections for traditional knowledge.
If the ultimate goal is to shift the global intellectual property regime
to one that is more favorable to the poor or to communities that have
been disadvantaged by intellectual property laws, a sui generis
traditional knowledge right may not be the most effective solution.
Indeed, it could have the opposite effect.

2009 but notable exceptions include the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand),
available
at
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=17716&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
165. Article 2.1 of the Convention defines intangible cultural heritage as “the practices,
representations, expressions, knowledge, skills— as well as the instruments, objects, artifacts
and cultural spaces associated therewith— that communities, groups and, in some cases,
individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage,
transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and
groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and
provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural
diversity and human creativity.” Examples of intangible cultural heritage listed in Article 2.2
of the Convention include oral traditions and expressions, performing arts, social practices,
rituals and festive events, knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe, and
traditional craftsmanship. This broad definition would include most, if not all, of what has
been defined as traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions at WIPO. Id.
166. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res 217A(III),
U.N.Doc A/180 at 71 (1948).
167. UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage,
art. 11, 13, 14 (2003).
168. Id. at art. 3.
169. Of course, since the negotiations are taking place outside of the WTO, it remains
to be seen how any new agreement will intersect with WTO Members TRIPS obligations.
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B. Traditional Knowledge Challenges
From a distributive justice perspective, traditional knowledge faces
at least two difficulties in the attempt to receive an intellectual property
type protection.
First, the introduction of a new intangible property right means a
retraction, at least with respect to some traditional knowledge, of the
170
This challenge requires
public domain as it is currently understood.
traditional knowledge holders to provide a solid public policy rationale
for limiting access to, and use of, such information. If a sui generis
traditional knowledge right is to be created, the broader social good
served by protecting traditional knowledge as a new form of intellectual
property should be very clearly articulated.
Second, due to its intergenerational nature, it has been suggested
that traditional knowledge should be protected indefinitely, and
171
possibly retroactively. This has implications for the accessibility and
affordability of the protected knowledge.
Third, traditional knowledge is linked to a people rather than to a
172
concept that has been reduced to form by a single identifiable creator.
This challenge is potentially a more significant one because it requires a
demarcation of explicit cultural and ethnic lines in defining a property
right. This task is further complicated by the fact that, contrary to what
some traditional knowledge proponents seem to assume, every society
has knowledge that has been handed down in one form or another. We
are potentially all traditional knowledge holders of some kind.
1. The Public Domain as a Eurocentric Concept
It has been observed that much of what is considered traditional

170. Whether or not one links the concept of “public domain” to intellectual property,
under the current international regime, there are no globally recognized proprietary rights in
those forms of traditional knowledge that do not meet the criteria for protection under
intellectual property law. Hence, from an intellectual property perspective, it is legally
available to the public, provided that it has not been kept secret.
171. Mataatua Declaration, Recommendation 2; WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF
SHAMANS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 15, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001);
see Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as a Policy
Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the United States, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 629, 655 (2007); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional
Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 251 (Spring 2001).
172. As WIPO has correctly observed, it is possible to have a group of rights holders.
Such a group would normally be a collective of identifiable individuals. It is also possible to
have a single entity having some public or official status as the right holder, in the case of
certification marks, for example, that is the right holder for the entitled group.
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knowledge is likely in the public domain.
Consequently, it could be
174
problematic to attempt to assert property rights over such material.
Whereas intellectual property law generally seeks to prevent creations
and innovations from falling into the public domain for a specified
period, an international treaty on traditional knowledge may involve the
creation of a new property right in information that is already publicly
175
known or at least known by certain groups of people.
However, the view that rejects intellectual property rights for
traditional knowledge on the basis that such rights would shrink the
176
public domain has been criticized as Eurocentric. For instance, some
WIPO participants have expressed the view that the public domain is
not a concept that was recognized by indigenous peoples and that
expressions of folklore, for example, could not have entered the public
177
domain if they were never protected as intellectual property.
These
intangible cultural goods are regulated by customary law rather than by
intellectual property law. Thus, some communities may consider
traditional knowledge as falling outside the intellectual property
concept of public domain.
Whether or not one acknowledges the concept of the public domain,
if one accepts that knowledge is a public or communal good, then it is
important to be cautious in creating laws that restrict access to this
good. Further, the empirical data on the effect of intellectual property
rights remains inconclusive, and the utility of strong intellectual
property rights at all stages of a nation’s economic development remains
178
questionable.
173. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS/EXPRESSIONS OF
FOLKLORE AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 9 (2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/igc/pdf/usa_tktce.pdf. At its tenth session, the WIPO IGC identified ten key questions relating to the
protection of TK, then sought comments on these issues from WIPO member states and
interested parties between its tenth (November–December 2006) and eleventh (July 2007)
sessions.
174. Id.
175. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at arts. 12, 33 (term of protection for copyright
and patent, respectively); id. at arts. 13, 27.3, 30 (limited exceptions to copyright and patent);
see Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
97, 101 (2007).
176. Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as a
Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the United
States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629, 647–649 (2007).
PROTECTION
OF
TRADITIONAL
CULTURAL
177. WIPO
IGC,
THE
EXPRESSIONS/EXPRESSIONS OF FOLKLORE: REVISED OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 40,
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4 (2006).
178. Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV 130, 132, 166 (2009); see FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, THOMAS

192 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1

One could respond that all property rights, by definition, reduce
accessibility. Further, it could be said that intellectual property rights
generally lead to higher cost goods in order to allow producers to
recoup rents. This may be true. This is also the reason why a solid
policy rationale is required before new intellectual property rights are
created. Moreover, it is not exclusively the public domain that should
be considered but also the broader social good that intellectual property
policy ideally supports.
If the objective sought can be achieved without creating a new
property right, then it seems that alternative methods should be
pursued—or at least thoroughly explored before creating the new right.
More importantly, if a sui generis traditional knowledge right could also
reduce access to affordable knowledge goods, including for developing
country nationals and local or indigenous communities, then perhaps it
is not the best defense against misappropriation and bio-piracy.
2. Perpetual Protection
A traditional knowledge right would not necessarily be
179
circumscribed by a limited term of protection. It is suggested that the
protection should be indefinite and even retroactive to protect historical
180
works. This is one aspect of traditional knowledge protection that is
clearly distinct from classical intellectual property law, and which
emphasizes some of the inconsistencies between the policy objectives of
intellectual property and traditional knowledge.
An important aspect of the intellectual property balance is that, for
most intellectual property forms, the protection granted is time
181
limited. Moreover, it can be observed that the term of protection is
COTTIER & FRANCIS GURRY, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN
INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 73–75 (2007).
179. WIPO, AFRICAN GROUP SUBMISSION ON DOCUMENT WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9
14, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/9 (2009); WIPO, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE, DRAFT GAP ANALYSIS: REVISION 28, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/5(b)
Rev. (2008); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 251 (Spring 2001).
180. Mataatua Declaration, Recommendation 2; WIPO IGC, DECLARATION OF
SHAMANS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC RESOURCES ¶ 15, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/14 (2001);
Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as a Policy
Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the United States, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 629, 655 (2007); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional
Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 251 (Spring 2001).
181. More recently accepted forms of international intellectual property, such as
geographical indications, are an exception to this principle of term limit. Though trademarks
can be renewed indefinitely, subject to certain conditions, there is a term of protection
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shorter for more restrictive rights. Thus, for example, the agreed upon
minimum term of patent protection is twenty years from the date of the
182
filing of the patent application. Patent protection is available only for
a single invention, so if someone else develops the same invention, the
183
patent will only go to one inventor. Copyright, by comparison, results
184
in a more limited monopoly.
Under the Berne Convention, the
minimum copyright term for literary and artistic works is the life of the
185
However, copyright law allows for the same
author plus fifty years.
independent creation to be protected, provided it is not a copy of
someone else’s original work. In this sense, copyright is a less restrictive
form of protection. The longer term of copyright protection is,
therefore, less detrimental to society as compared to a lengthy patent
term.
In other words, intellectual property law needs to be balanced so
that the state granted monopoly over intellectual creations is not,
ultimately, detrimental to the public.
However, due to its
intergenerational nature, traditional knowledge could be protected
indefinitely and even retroactively. This may not be consistent with the
equity-oriented objective of access to affordable traditional knowledge
goods. Thus, any indefinite right granted should be relatively less
restrictive in order not to offend the principle of a balance between the
186
interests of the right holder and the public.
3. Identifying the Traditional or Indigenous Traditional Knowledge
Producing Community
By
definition,
the
protectable
knowledge
should
be
intergenerational, associated with a traditional or indigenous
community, and integral to the cultural identity of the indigenous or

provided for trademarks. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 18.
182. Id. at art. 33. For a patent to be granted the innovation must be new, useful and
non-obvious. Once an innovation has been invented, the same invention can no longer meet
the criteria for patent protection, and a second patent will not be granted. See id. at art.
27(1).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 27.1 (setting out
requirement of novelty for patentability); 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 (g), 135 (provisions on
interference).
184. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (provides that copyright subsists in
“original works of authorship”—two individuals can individually paint the same scene and
each will be entitled to copyright protection for her work).
185. Berne Convention, supra note 94, at art. 7(1); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at
art. 12.
186. For a more in depth discussion on this point, see J. Janewa OseiTutu, Traditional
Knowledge: Is Perpetual Protection a Good Idea? 50 IDEA No. 4, 697 (2010).
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traditional community who are the custodians of such knowledge. At
the same time, traditional knowledge is characterized as neither old, nor
188
static. It is constantly being revised, improved and regenerated. That
said, is the difference between traditional knowledge and other
knowledge primarily cultural? Who is this indigenous person or
community for whom protection is sought? To whom does the benefit
accrue when benefit sharing is implemented?
Who should be
compensated? This raises the question of not only the group identity,
but is also relevant to the question of term of protection. For example,
how far back in time should one look in order to correctly identify the
189
beneficiaries?
WIPO does not define the groups that could be covered by any
potential international treaty, or other legal instrument that may be
eventually agreed upon by WIPO Member states. Many country
190
delegations do, however, acknowledge the need for a definition. For
the purpose of defining the scope of the right, it would be preferable to
191
have some basic definition of the potential right holder.
Since it is
possible, in some instances, to have group ownership of an intellectual
property right, the communal nature of a traditional knowledge right is
192
not necessarily a barrier to protection.
Additionally, it has been
pointed out that it is not accurate to say that traditional knowledge is
always communal and that Western intellectual property is individual.
The traditional knowledge may be in the hands of a select few, an
exclusive group of men or women, and may not necessarily be widely
193
held knowledge. The right holder could, therefore, be a group. It is
187. WIPO IGC, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE—OPERATIONAL TERMS AND
DEFINITIONS 11, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/13/9 (2002).
188. WIPO ICG, REVIEW OF EXISTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 11, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/7 (2002).
189. There are several related questions that may arise with respect to identification
and compensation, some of which may be too detailed to address in an international
agreement. For example, will only those people who still live in the particular community or
country, to the exclusion of those who moved out the community or to another country, be
included among the rights holders? Would the right extend to persons who have a parent
who is not part of the relevant traditional knowledge generating community? These are
examples of the complex matters that would have to be addressed at some point— most likely
at the national level. Thanks to Lisa P. Ramsey for highlighting some of these issues.
190. WIPO IGC, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: REVISED
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, art. 4, p. 22, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5 (2006).
191. See, e.g., Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417 (1985).
192. See WIPO ICG, REVIEW OF EXISTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 12, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/7 (2002).
193. GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 328 (2008).
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not clear, however, how to identify the persons who would comprise this
194
group. In the intellectual property context, when the right holder is a
group, the boundaries of the group are normally clearly delineated, and
the group is usually comprised of a collection of identifiable
195
individuals.
In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a
196
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (“DRIP”).
Unfortunately, the DRIP contains no definition of an indigenous
197
person.
In any event, the meaning of indigenous person may be
different in the traditional knowledge context than in other areas.
Further, the term “indigenous” may have multiple meanings in the
context of the traditional knowledge discussion.
In the absence of an agreed upon definition, I start by looking at a
198
plain language meaning of the term. The Concise Oxford Dictionary
defines the term “indigenous” as meaning, “originating or naturally
199
occurring in a particular place; native.”
This terminology has been
utilized to describe the people European adventurers met at the lands
they found. Hence, the peoples Europeans met in the Americas have
been referred to as “natives” as have the peoples Europeans
encountered when they voyaged to places such as India and Africa.
In an early study, WIPO took as a working definition of indigenous

194. See the discussion at section III of the paper.
195. See e.g., the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §101 (2006) defines a “joint
work” as the work of “two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”; see also U.S. Patent
Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §111 (2009), which states that the inventor, or person authorized by
the inventor, may apply for a patent; 35 U.S.C. §116 (2009), which provides that if there is
more than one inventor, they shall jointly apply for the patent; 35 U.S.C. §118 (2009)
(outlining circumstances where someone other than the inventor may file for patent
protection).
196. United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), available
at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html (Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the United States voted against the adoption of the Declaration).
197. See PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33
(2002).
198. In other fields of international law, including trade law, resort is made to the
ordinary meaning of the words, including the use of dictionaries. In addition it is customary
to resort to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) (“a
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”). The
term “indigenous” could be interpreted in its context to refer to people who were colonized.
However, for the purpose of illustrating the point about the implication of the definition for
the scope of the right, I will make use of the simple dictionary definition of the word
“indigenous.”
199. CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1999).
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communities, peoples, and nations:
[T]hose which, having a historical continuity with ‘preinvasion’ and pre-colonial societies that developed on
their territories, consider themselves distinct from other
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those countries,
or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve,
develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identities, as the
basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural pattern, social
200
institutions, and legal systems.
The term “traditional” or “indigenous” peoples, as it is used in the
traditional knowledge discourse, appears to refer essentially to those
persons who are not of European origin. However, the precise scope of
persons who may be considered indigenous is not obvious from the
WIPO materials relating to traditional knowledge, or from the literature
on the protection of indigenous peoples and their cultural heritage. In
the context of the traditional knowledge narrative it is not apparent that
this term is limited to those persons described in Western dialogue as
“Aboriginal” or “First Nations” in places such as Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand, to the exclusion of African, Asian, and Latin American
201
ethnic or ‘tribal’ groups.
Although there is no agreed upon definition of “indigenous” or
“traditional” persons, the common thread that has been identified
among the various definitions is the recognition that “a people’s deep,
historical, ancestral roots to traditional lands as integral to
202
indigeneity.” While this may be a good starting point, the fact remains
203
This therefore
there is no global definition of indigenous peoples.
creates a certain element of risk due to the difficulty in limiting the
200. WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1998–1999), 23 (2001),
available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/index/html.
201. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of
Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1103 (2009) (describing most of the world’s indigenous peoples
as residing in the developing world).
202. Id. at 1034–35.
203. Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VANDERBILT JRNL. TRANSNAT’L L.
1141, 1163 (2008) (noting the absence of definition of the term indigenous people in the
United Nations Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples, and explaining that many
scholars have justified this lack of definition).
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scope of a potential traditional knowledge property right.
For
instance, it has been proposed that the immediate beneficiaries of a
traditional knowledge right should be the direct descendants of the
205
traditional guardians of the knowledge.
This would require an
identification of not only the relevant community, but also the
individuals within the community who are entitled to some kind of right
in the traditional knowledge. Given the intergenerational nature of
traditional knowledge, this could be quite a complex and daunting,
although not impossible, task.
It may also be that the term “indigenous” or “traditional” implies a
reference to aboriginal societies living traditional lifestyles as opposed
to modern lifestyles. There are many difficulties in identifying and
categorizing such a group, including the fact that it is rare to find
206
peoples who are entirely “traditional.”
When we entertain the
Colombian suggestion that intellectual property rights should recognize
the traditional knowledge of indigenous, “Afro-American” or local
communities, the notion of an indigenous or traditional person can
207
become quite broad. Guatemala considers itself to be a country with a
majority population comprised of indigenous and traditional
communities. Consequently, many of the creations of a given country
208
could theoretically be protectable as traditional knowledge. Similarly,
Asian countries have submitted to WIPO that they are “mostly rich in
209
genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore . . . .”
The various categories of intellectual property law are defined on
the basis of the knowledge that is created. In this way, intellectual
property rights are open to anyone whose innovation or creative work

204. Id.
205. See Mataatua Declaration, Recommendation 2.
206. I recall being struck by the sight of a Masai man walking through the streets of a
small dusty town in Tanzania, wearing the telltale traditional bright Masai cloth and the
traditional Masai footwear, listening to his iPod as he walked along, his cell phone tucked in
his belt. Given that the Masai are essentially herdsmen and cattle ranchers, he may depend
on the land, and probably rears his cattle in accordance with traditional methods handed
down from generation to generation. At the same time, he will likely have modern elements
to his life, and may well make use of new technologies that are protected by intellectual
property rights, such as mobile phones, to conduct business.
207. WIPO IGC, REPORT ¶ 29, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009).
208. Id. ¶ 31; Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VANDERBILT JRNL. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1141, 1163 (2008) (observing that, while it is not consistent with his understanding of the
term, some African nations claim that all Africans are indigenous).
209. WIPO IGC, POSITION PAPER OF THE ASIAN GROUP AND CHINA 1, WIPO Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/10 (2001).
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meets the criteria for protection. Traditional knowledge is defined by
the knowledge produced, which is to be handed down through the
generations. It is further defined by the characteristics of the people
who produce such knowledge. Traditional knowledge producers are
described as “traditional” or “indigenous” peoples. As it has been
characterized thus far, this new form of intangible property would be a
form of protection that would not be available to all humanity.
An intangible property right that is, by definition, explicitly linked to
ethnic identities raises a variety of issues which go beyond the scope of
this paper. However, when one considers the meaning of traditional
knowledge in the broadest sense, there are significant frailties in the
distinction between non-indigenous information that is handed down
through the generations and the intergenerational indigenous or
traditional knowledge. The next section of this paper turns to a
discussion of other kinds of intergenerational, or traditional, knowledge.
C. Other Intergenerational Knowledge Goods
1. Cultural Exchange
Culture is not static. Rather, various cultures interact to borrow
211
from and influence one another. Depending on the level of exclusivity
of a sui generis traditional knowledge right, one indigenous or
traditional community could find that it is unable to make free use of
traditional knowledge from another indigenous or traditional
community. There is also the risk of a reduced availability of traditional
knowledge to those within that traditional society who don’t have rights
of access. Furthermore, the current concept of traditional knowledge
may be relatively easily broadened to include not only developing

210. I acknowledge there may be cost barriers to obtaining intellectual property rights.
211. Cultural exchange means that Asian arts such as acupuncture, Karate, and Yoga
have become common in the Western world as well as throughout the developing world.
Thus one can find Karate classes everywhere—from Africa to Europe to North America.
Further, cultural migration and exchange lead to cultural traditions such as African American
step dancing that are derived from African traditional dances. At the same time, young
Africans have incorporated African American step dancing and hip hop dancing into their
youth culture. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Piracy, Biopiracy and Borrowing: Culture,
Cultural Heritage and the Globalization of Intellectual Property, 20- 21 (Case Res. Paper
Series in Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 04-19, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=596921 (observing that to ignore the role of borrowing among
cultures creates a static view of culture and that notions of piracy and biopiracy demonize
borrowing); id. at 60–62 (“The potential complexities involved in establishing cultural
boundaries are often ignored in public discourse about local knowledge,” and arguing that
culture is not static and any “process of borrowing necessarily involves acts of
appropriation.”).
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country cultural heritage and knowledge but also the cultural heritage
and knowledge of some European communities.
For example, methods of wine and cheese production tend to be
based on cultural practices of European groups who could be
considered “indigenous,” in the purest sense of the word, to their
localities. The value Europeans place on their cultural food products is
reflected in the European demand for increased international protection
212
for geographical indications.
In bi-lateral trade agreements, the
European Union has also sought protection for “traditional
213
expressions” for European wines.
The knowledge about the uses of the neem tree or turmeric may be
valuable intergenerational knowledge. However, there are many other
kinds of ancient knowledge, which appear to have been discounted.
One might argue that if traditional knowledge is about power and
inequality, a discussion that excludes the colonial context is not a true
214
discussion at all.
In my view, it becomes a discussion about the
characteristics of the knowledge and not about the characteristics of the
generators of the knowledge. This allows the analysis to focus on the
nature of the property, instead of the nature of the property owner.
The next section turns to a discussion of some common household
items to illustrate that intergenerational knowledge is not necessarily
exclusive to particular ethnic groups.
2. Vinegar and Silver as Examples
Vinegar and silver have been used for generations for their cleansing
or healing properties, the knowledge of which comprises
intergenerational knowledge. It may seem somewhat extreme to
consider the uses of vinegar as traditional knowledge. This may be
because its uses date back so far, or perhaps because it has become so
212. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at arts. 22–24 (provisions on geographical
indications); Daniel Gervais, The Lisbon Agreement’s Misunderstood Potential (The WIPO
Journal, Working Paper No. 10-21, 2009) (discussing renewed interest in the Lisbon
Agreement and the relationship between geographical indications and appellations of origin);
Irene Calboli, Expanding the Protection of Geographical Indications of Origin Under TRIPS:
“Old” Debate or “New” Opportunity?, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 181, 182 (2006).
213. See, e.g., Canada and the European Community on Trade in Wine and Spirits
Agreement (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/itpd-dpci/ag-ac/4971-eng.htm;
Agreement Between the European Community and Australia on Trade in Wine (Dec. 1, 2008)
(replaces 1994 Agreement).
214. Dorothy E. Roberts, Why Culture Matters to Law: the Difference Politics Makes in
CULTURAL PLURALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE LAW, AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R.
KEARNS, EDS. 83 (University of Michigan Press, 1999) (noting that culture matters to law and
that apparently neutral legal principles that purport to disregard culture effectively privilege
the existing dominant cultural norms)
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commonly used globally—having spread from one culture to another—
that it does not immediately strike one as intergenerational cultural
knowledge or traditional knowledge.
Well known for its preservative, antiseptic and cleansing properties,
vinegar has been used for generations in various capacities. According
to the recorded history of vinegar, the Babylonians used it as far back as
several thousand years ago to preserve and pickle food. The ancient
Greek, Hippocrates, subsequently prescribed vinegar to fight infections
215
and various illnesses.
Similarly, the ancient Greeks, Romans and
216
The Greeks apparently
others used silver to keep water pure.
discovered the health benefits of silver, noting that those with silver
217
canteens did not get sick. Silver continues to be used in a medical
218
capacity for its antibacterial properties.
Credit is perhaps due to the Greek tribes for our modern day
knowledge of the health benefits of vinegar and silver. If this ancient
knowledge is not protectable as a form of intangible property, is it
because it is too old, even though the uses continue to evolve, or
because the Greeks are not “indigenous”? Is it because such knowledge
has become part of the common heritage of humankind? If this
knowledge had been protectable, what would our modern day uses of
vinegar and silver look like? Might all non-Greeks need to seek
permission for certain uses? If so, this kind of system could easily lead,
it seems, to the excessive concentration of power through control over
intangible goods. Even if this would not have been the result, it is not
apparent what would have been the benefit to the global public— to
humankind—had such knowledge been treated as a form of intangible
property. Using an instrumentalist analysis, one might ask what would
be the objective sought and how it would serve the distributive justice
goals of ensuring access to affordable knowledge goods.
The question then becomes whether the reasons for creating a new
215. ENZYME FACTS, http://www.enzyme-facts.com/vinegar-history.html (last visited
Sept.
18,
2010);
VINEGAR
WORKS
WONDERS,
http://www.vinegarworkswonders.com/history.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2010); VINEGAR
HISTORY: HOW THE ANCIENTS BENEFITTED FROM VINEGAR, http://www.apple-cidervinegar-benefits.com/vinegar-history.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
216. OVERVIEW OF SILVER, http://www.burnsurgery.com/Modules/silver/section1.htm
(last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
217. See generally The Historical Uses of Silver (April 17 2008), available at
http://colloidal-silver-solution.blogspot.com/2008/04/historical-uses-of-silver.html; LOIS N.
MAGNER, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE 8 (2d ed. 2005).
218. Shan Bergin & Paul Wraight, Silver Based Wound Dressings and Topical Agents
for Treating Diabetic Foot Ulcers, THE COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVS. (Jan.
2006).
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right make sense in the context of intellectual property law and whether
a property right is a good solution if there are other alternatives
available. In my view, because traditional knowledge seems to be
primarily about equity, the solution should focus on achieving a more
equitable intellectual property outcome. This can be done through
means other than the creation of new property rights. On the other
hand, one might observe that property rights are linked to power and
equality. However, if the distinction between traditional or indigenous
peoples and non-traditional peoples fails to achieve clarity in an
international instrument, I query whether more equality is likely to be
achieved. For example, will indigenous and local people improve their
economic condition or have increased access to affordable knowledge
goods?
If traditional knowledge is primarily about the dynamics of
inequality, a new intellectual property style right is a poor solution.
First, traditional knowledge seems to be partially a response to the
overreach of the intellectual property system. Second, I query the
efficacy of addressing what appears to be partly an issue of human rights
and political inequality through the use of an intellectual property
model. This is particularly so in light of the reasons for having
intellectual property rights and some of the problems that may be
associated with them. Third, the overreach of intellectual property law
219
is not limited to developing countries and poor people. The defects of
the intellectual property system from a traditional knowledge
perspective should be characterized not as a North-South issue but as an
excessive intellectual property rights issue. This does not mean that
intellectual property rights do not have a disparate impact on certain
groups, nor does it mean that this disparate impact should go
unacknowledged. However, the better solution is to curtail the
intellectual property system, not to expand it.
The potentially broad category of rights holders, combined with the
possibility of perpetual protection make a sui generis traditional
knowledge right likely to increase the cost while decreasing the
accessibility of traditional knowledge goods. Creating more property
rights in intangibles is not necessarily beneficial for the global public,
219. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(“Myriad Genetics”) (The court invalidated patents held by Myriad genetics that pertain to
testing for a genetic predisposition to breast cancer. The plaintiffs included the Association
for Molecular Pathology, the American College of Medical Genetics, the American Society
for Clinical Pathology, the College of American Pathologists, various individual scientists,
medical professional, and patients who were in need of the testing. The decision has been
appealed.).
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nor consistent with a distributive justice approach to global intellectual
property law. Developing country nationals, many of whom struggle to
pay the costs for patented medicines or copyrighted works may find that
they suddenly have to pay for items, including those of European origin,
220
which they had not conceptualized as traditional knowledge.
For
example, how would one distinguish an Italian claim to the method of
preparing espresso or cappuccino from other culture-based claims? If
the preparation of espresso could be considered an innovation handed
down from generation to generation, there is no clear reason why it
could not be considered traditional knowledge. There is no simple
solution to this problem, nor do I purport to have the answers.
However, if the problem is reframed as an issue of the fair and equitable
treatment of traditional and indigenous peoples, rather than as a matter
of intellectual property law per se, it may help to advance the dialogue.
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
A. The Need for a Balanced System
In addition to those who have raised concern over issues such as biopiracy, some scholars have observed that there is a current imbalance in
221
the intellectual property regime. Others have emphasized the dangers
of overprotecting intellectual property and the harm that results from a
222
shrinking public domain.
Professor Boyle, for example, points out
that the expansionist intellectual property agenda has upset the
fundamental balance between intellectual property and the public
220. SUSAN SCAFINDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND
AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 99–100 (2005) (discussing a television narrative about
the Italian origin of food products such as cappuccino and espresso, which are now
commonly found in coffee shops around the world). Though this is a fictional account, it is
illustrative of the difficulty in limiting what is considered traditional knowledge.
221. See RICHARD A. SPINELLO & MARIA BOTTIS, A DEFENSE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 1–4 (Edward Elgar ed., 2009) (describing the extensive scholarly
criticisms of the excesses of the IP regime and noting that, though the entire IP system should
not be overhauled, there is a need for balance and reform); Anupam Chander & Madhavi
Sunder, Symposium: Forward: Is Nozick Kicking Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual Property and
Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563, 574–77 (Mar. 2007) (advocating a social justice
approach to intellectual property, which would take into account a range of human values
beyond an incentive theory approach to intellectual property).
222. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
8–9 (2008) (explaining that intellectual property law does not necessarily work as it should,
but sometimes does the exact opposite, becoming “a kind of perpetual corporate welfare—
restraining the next generation of creators instead of encouraging them”); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37–41 (2003) (describing the expansion of intellectual property rights);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001).
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domain.
The faulty assumption underlying the promotion of
increasingly strong intellectual property rights is that this will lead to
more progress. However, it is by maintaining a balance that we are best
224
able to achieve the goals of a healthy intellectual property system.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the benefits of open
225
access go to the wealthy and powerful.
As a matter of distributive
justice, this supports the need for some form of global protection for
traditional knowledge. The question is whether a sui generis intellectual
property right is the solution. The traditional knowledge dialogue
appears to be primarily about the relationship between the knowledge
226
that is protected by intellectual property law and that which is not. In
essence, the way in which the intellectual property regime intersects
with traditional knowledge and facilitates what is seen as the unfair use
of this knowledge can be identified as a significant part of the problem.
If one approaches international intellectual property ‘from below,’
the system should, arguably, be modified to ensure that the concerns of
developing countries and indigenous peoples are addressed.
Developing countries have already found the global expansion of
minimum standards difficult to contend with and, in some cases,
227
expensive to implement. Moreover, from a public policy perspective,
223. James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004
DUKE L. & TECH REV. 0009, 2 (2004) .
224. Id. at 11 (encouraging a return to the “rational roots of intellectual property
rather than an embrace of its recent excesses”).
225. Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 97, 106 (2007).
226. The problem seems to be not just that intellectual property rights are unavailable
for all kinds of traditional knowledge. Rather, there is some level of discontent about the
ability of persons and entities external to the knowledge generating community to obtain
intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge based goods. This explains the use of
the term “bio-piracy.”
227. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 302
(1997) (“Now that there is time to be more reflective, we should recognize that as far as
developing countries are concerned, the TRIPS Agreement could have a substantially
different impact from the remainder of the WTO agreements. One effect is obvious: the cost
to member states of enforcing intellectual property rights is formidable. Monitoring is
expensive, the obligation to destroy infringing materials entails high social costs, and
countries with weak civil justice systems must spend the money to create them. All of this is
in addition to the cost of setting up copyright, trademark, and patent offices and staffing them
with trained personnel. Even after these costs are borne, the TRIPS Agreement may present
a significant problem to developing countries.”); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement
Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 335, 348–49 (1997) (“[D]eveloping
countries face real difficulties in overcoming technological lag at socially acceptable costs, and
most of the benefits they may derive from implementing the substantive standards will take
time to accrue.”).
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there should be a balancing of rights and an assessment of the public
228
benefit. A more balanced system would provide protection for rights
holders while ensuring adequate protections for users. A more
equitable system would recognize and respect the contributions of nonWestern cultures, as well as the interests of individuals, vis-à-vis large
corporations or institutions.
The citizens of the demandeur states may, despite the interest of
these governments in protecting traditional knowledge, ultimately not
benefit if an intangible intellectual property style right for traditional
knowledge becomes globally recognized. If the goal in protecting
traditional knowledge is to ensure that indigenous and traditional
peoples experience social and economic gains, advocating traditional
knowledge as beneficial for developing countries and indigenous
communities, on the assumption that developing but not developed
countries are rich in intergenerational knowledge and culture, may be a
risky proposition.
1. Beyond the North-South Framework
The desire for an international regime to protect traditional
knowledge may be part of a negotiating strategy in response to
developing country demands for stronger intellectual property rights.
The trade-off would be that the developed countries would be required
to protect traditional knowledge in exchange for enhanced intellectual
229
property laws. In other words, the developed countries have, through
TRIPS, obtained protection for their intellectual goods, and developing
countries seek to do the same, both as a defensive and offensive
230
strategy, in response to TRIPS. The perception exists at WIPO that

228. Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L.
REV. 979, 1004–05, 1007 (2009) (discussing the balancing aspects of the TRIPS Agreement).
229. Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements as a
Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the United
States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629, 689–92 (2007) (observing that developing countries have sought
to negotiate traditional knowledge protection at the WTO in exchange for higher levels of IP
protection based on the principle of reciprocity, and advocating this negotiating strategy as a
fair one given the sacrifice made by developing countries to implement TRIPS for the benefit
of developed countries); see Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional
Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 271 (Spring 2001); Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics,
Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 433, 482–83 (Summer 2008).
230. Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 97, 111–12 (Spring 2007); see Jerome H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of
Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES J. INTL L. 441,
451–52 (Summer 2000) (noting the concern the benefits of higher levels of intellectual
property protection are unevenly distributed to the detriment of developing countries, while
developing country proposals for a new form of intellectual property to protect traditional
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the developed countries are interested in justifying international
agreements aimed at strengthening or harmonizing international
intellectual property norms, while resisting any attempt to address
traditional knowledge protection, which is primarily a developing
231
country concern.
However, bio-piracy, the misappropriation of genetic resources, and
the issue of control over genetic information extend beyond the context
232
of traditional knowledge.
In other words, the underlying problems
that inform the traditional knowledge discussion are not limited to
233
developing countries or indigenous peoples.
In the United States, for example, there have been various instances
of litigation arising from genetic research. The cases concern issues
similar to those raised in the traditional knowledge narrative. These
include the matter of prior informed consent and the ability of the
persons providing the genetic materials to retain control over the use of
such materials and any associated intellectual property rights arising
234
from the research. Thus, in the context of genetic research, there have
been discussions about community rights versus individual rights in
knowledge were not well received).
231. See generally WIPO IGC, REPORT, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009);
Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 233, 273 (Spring 2001) (observing that solutions to prevent misappropriation have
more to do with human rights than IP rights).
232. For a discussion of the problem as it relates to the control of genetic information,
see THE GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC INFORMATION: WHO DECIDES? (Heather Widdows &
Caroline Mullen eds., 2009).
233. I acknowledge that, due to power imbalances, developing country nationals and
indigenous groups are more susceptible to unfair treatment by commercial entities.
234. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (plaintiff
complained that his physicians failed to disclose pre-existing research and economic interests
in his cells before extracting them); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst.,
Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d. 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (plaintiffs sought to control the uses of genetic
materials taken for research purposes, and from which a gene was isolated, a test developed
and a patent obtained); Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 F.3d. 1063 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2008) (the Havasupai tribe filed suit after discovering that their genetic materials were
being used for purposes for which they had not given their consent. The proceedings are
ongoing. The Association of Molecular Pathology, American College of Medical Genetics,
American Society for Clinical Pathology, and College of American Pathologists challenged
the validity of the Myriad patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. The Myriad patents are
allegedly interfering with further breast cancer research and treatments and have been
challenged as contrary to the U.S. Constitution, the First Amendment free speech right, and
the Fourteenth Amendment); see Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d.
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (this case is illustrative of the controversy that surrounds gene patents in
general, and those related to medical and health issues in particular). Clearly, it is not only
developing countries and disenfranchised peoples who may benefit if the intellectual
property system is corrected to ensure that intellectual property rights are beneficial rather
than harmful.
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controlling information, as well as questions about how best to share the
235
benefits arising from the use of the research.
The objective of controlling genetic materials and preventing
companies from obtaining patent rights in such materials is not unlike
the desire of traditional knowledge holders to control the use of the
genetic resources found on their lands. Like human genetic materials,
the spiritual or cultural aspects of traditional knowledge are not
currently protected under the law. In other words, developing countries
and traditional or local peoples are not the only complainants. The
tensions in the intellectual property regime can be seen in a variety of
236
situations, even within developed countries.
A distributive justice
analysis of intellectual property that gives greater weight to the useroriented social goods may assist in correcting the imbalance in both
industrialized and industrializing countries.
2. A Question of Justice
The protection of traditional knowledge may be seen as not only an
237
intellectual property issue, but also as a trade and human rights issue.
235. See, e.g., Søren Holm, Me, Myself, I—Against Narcissism in the Governance of
Genetic Information, in THE GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC INFORMATION: WHO DECIDES? 37
(Heather Widdows & Caroline Mullen eds., 2009) (discussing whether the individual, the
family, or the state should retain control over genetic information); see also, Heather
Widdows, Constructing Communal Models of Governance: Collectives of Individuals or
Distinct Ethical Loci?, in THE GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC INFORMATION: WHO DECIDES?
75, 84–85 (Heather Widdows & Caroline Mullen eds., 2009). The matter of the taking of the
genetic materials of indigenous groups has been raised in the genetic information debate as
well. However, the discussion is not with respect to cultural property, nor intellectual
property rights, but rather the question of fairness and informed consent.
236. Patents related to genetic materials and life forms are not without controversy.
Some countries have decided not to grant patents on life forms. For example, the Supreme
Court of Canada decided that the Harvard onco-mouse was not patentable subject matter
under Canadian law. See Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R.
45 (Can.).
237. Stephen J. Munzer & Kal Raustiala The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property
Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 48 (“[T]he
contemporary debate about TK centers on economically subordinate groups, almost always
indigenous peoples, and the movement of their understanding or skill to economically more
powerful Western (or Westernized) groups or nations.”); WIPO IGC, REPORT ¶ 30,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009). I acknowledge that intellectual property rights have
sometimes been characterized as human rights based on Article 27 of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. res. 217A(III), U.N.Doc A/180 (1948). However, Intellectual Property rights are
generally treated a property rights, rather than human rights. Further, Articles 27(1) and (2)
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights recognize a right for all persons to enjoy the
benefit of scientific and literary creations, while at the same time acknowledging the right of
the creator to the material and moral interests in his or her work. This would be consistent
with a balanced approach to intellectual property protection rather than a creator-focused
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The justifications for an international traditional knowledge instrument
tend to highlight the rights of the affected population to protect its
culture, heritage and dignity. This right-holder centered approach may
be logical in the context of a human rights framework where the
primary policy objective is the protection of the individual’s
238
personhood, dignity and liberty. Nevertheless, it may not be suitable
within an intellectual property framework. It may also be an indication
of weaknesses in international norms regulating rights of groups
marginalized globally, and which would be more appropriately
addressed in other multilateral settings.
A human rights framework for intellectual property, based in part of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has been proposed, but
239
such framework remains to be fully developed. In any event, it would
require a consideration of the rights of both users and producers of
240
intangible goods.
The raison d’etre for intellectual property rights
should not merely be the protection of the right holder, but also the
various public goods intellectual property policy seeks to achieve.
Intellectual property law strives to maintain a balance between the
public good of access and the free movement of information with the
need to protect creators and innovators. It does so with a view to
stimulating further creative activity. A predominantly creator-focused
approach, which is the approach some traditional knowledge
proponents tend to take, leads to an intangible rights regime that is
241
tilted heavily in favor of the right holder. This appears to be the same
approach to intellectual property protection.
238. Even such rights may be limited when, in the context of hate speech, for example,
there is a risk of harm to the public.
239. Laurence R. Helfer, Towards a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 1015–20 (2007) (proposes the use of a human rights
framework in approaching the traditional knowledge debate. Professor Helfer suggests that a
human rights framework could be used in three possible ways: 1) to expand intellectual
property rights, 2) to impose external limits on intellectual property, or 3) to use intellectual
property law to help achieve human rights objectives); see also Mary W. S. Wong, Toward an
Alternative Normative Framework For Copyright: From Private Property to Human Rights, 26
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775 (2009) (advocating the use of a human rights framework as
a way to accommodate both property rights and development interests, thereby achieving a
better balance).
240. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A(III),
U.N. Doc /810, art. 27 (1948). Art 27 States: (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement
and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
241.
See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest
eds., 2000) (giving an overview of the different theories on intellectual property). Thomas
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kind of logic that has led to the development of policies that have
prompted a fair amount of scholarly and public critique of the current
242
intellectual property system.
However, instrumentalist intellectual
property policy should not be weighted in favor of the protected
information, person or group to the detriment of the public. This would
be contrary to the goals of distributive justice.
Intellectual property rights can be described as the relationship
between individuals in respect of their desire to control intangible goods
243
or abstract objects.
Can we find a way to minimize abuses in the
dynamic of this relationship between commercial entities and
individuals? This appears to be a significant element of the problem
faced by traditional knowledge holders. The status quo seems to reflect
a preference for the interests of commercial entities to the detriment of
individual persons or communities. By re-characterizing the problem
that needs to be addressed, effective alternative solutions can be
developed.

Jefferson rejected a natural rights view on intellectual property and instead adopted a
utilitarian approach. See Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of
Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1030 (2006) (stating
that Jefferson doubted “natural rights to property of any sort”).
242. See e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS (1996); PETER
DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY? (2003); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS; MICHELE BOLDRIN &
DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008); MICHAEL PERELMAN,
STEAL THIS IDEA (2002); Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 254–56 (2009) (criticizing
the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) India Plans Front to Nip New Piracy Law, THE
ECON.
TIMES
(May
29,
2010),
available
at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5986902.cms (discussing India’s concerns
over the effects of ACTA on exports of information technology and medicine as well as
India’s efforts in getting other developing countries to unite together in opposition to
ACTA); WTO, Council Debates Anti-counterfeiting Talks, Patents on Life, WTO News Items
(June 9, 2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/trip_08jun10_e.htm
(noting that China and India conducted lengthy statements against ACTA and how ACTA
conflicts with the TRIPS Agreement); Monika Ermert, Indian Official: ACTA Out of Sync
With TRIPS and Public Health, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 5, 2010), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2010/05/05/indian-official-acta-out-of-sync-with-trips-and-publichealth/(stating that ACTA will be hard on India due to juggling of competing public policy
issues, IPR protection and public health.); Doug Palmer, U.N. Urged to Probe U.S. Trade
(Jul
20,
2010),
Stance
on
Generic
Drugs,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66J1CG20100720 (stating that AIDS groups are
accusing the United States of “using the ‘Special 301’ report to pressure countries to give up
certain public health rights they have under a World Trade Organization agreement on
intellectual property rights known as TRIPS.”).
243. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 5 (1996);
SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN
AMERICAN LAW 159 (2005).
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B. Intellectual Property Related Solutions that Don’t Require an
Expansion of the Existing Regime
It may be inaccurate to assume that the general public and the local
communities that develop traditional knowledge will be served by
expanding the notion of intangible property. Indeed, intellectual
property law can play only a small role in responding to the problems
faced by local and indigenous communities.
A legally binding
international instrument that is based on an intellectual property model,
while useful in achieving a global standard, is not the only solution. It is
worth remembering that the adequate protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights, as required by TRIPS, has proven to be a
244
challenge.
A new traditional knowledge right would not help to
relieve this burden. Furthermore, it would still need to be implemented,
monitored and enforced in order to be effective.
Adjusting the current global intellectual property regime would be
preferable to creating a sui generis intellectual property right in
traditional knowledge. It may also be more effective in achieving a
greater degree of fairness than creating a parallel intellectual property
system. The protection of traditional knowledge is a complex problem
for which there is no simple comprehensive solution. I suggest a multipronged approach, and offer some preliminary suggestions for
alternatives that may be worthy of further consideration. This includes
a discussion of some possibilities that may have already been raised at
the WIPO or the WTO.
1. Accounting for Diverse Circumstances
A distributive justice approach to global intellectual property would
shift the policy space from the focus on economic utilitarianism towards
244. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Report 15 (2010)
(noting that, despite the grace periods given for TRIPS implementation, many developing
countries have yet to establish effective mechanisms for enforcing intellectual property rights
while some are still finalizing legislation to implement their TRIPS obligations); WTO
dispute resolution panels have been established to resolve various TRIPS disputes relating to
its implementation or enforcement. See, e.g., WTO, China—Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Request for the Establishment of
Panel by the United States) (2007); WTO, European Communities—Protection of
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (Request
for the Establishment of Panel by the United States) (2003); WTO, European Communities –
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs, (Request for the Establishment of Panel by Australia) (2003); WTO, Canada—
Term of Patent Protection, (Report of the Appellate Body) (2000); WTO, United States—
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, (Report of the Panel) (2000); WTO, India—Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (Complaint by the
European Communities and their Member States) (1998).
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addressing the imbalances in the intellectual property system so that it
does not encroach on the rights of those who lack economic, political
and informational resources. This may require developing measures to
prevent the inappropriate use of traditional knowledge in obtaining
intellectual property rights. As part of this, the regime should be
refined so that sophisticated users of the global intellectual property
system do not trample upon poor people’s rights. This issue is being
tackled in multiple fora and has been addressed to some extent in
multilateral agreements such as the CBD, and the International Treaty
245
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Further, various
proposals are under consideration at the WTO TRIPS Council to
address the matter of disclosure of genetic resources in patent
246
applications.
Paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration directs the WTO TRIPS
Council to consider the relationship between traditional knowledge and
247
intellectual property.
In addition, WTO members issued a Doha
Declaration on Public Health in which they expressly agreed that the
TRIPS agreement should be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to
248
allow member States to address the health needs of their populations.
A declaration on TRIPS and traditional knowledge would be consistent
with the work mandated by paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration. The
statements therein could be aimed at increasing the likelihood of an
interpretation of TRIPS that is consistent with the notion of respect for
249
traditional knowledge.
Additionally, WIPO could set guidelines to prevent the
inappropriate exertion of intellectual property rights over traditional
knowledge. The Model Provisions on Folklore contain some useful
250
elements. For example, section 1 of the Model Provisions establishes
245. FAO
Conference,
Resolution
3/2001
(2001),
available
at
http://www.fao.org/Legal/TREATIES/033s-e.htm. The United States has signed but not
ratified the treaty.
246. See WTO, Article 27.36, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/art27_3b_e.htm; WIPO, Submission by
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway and the United States of America, 2 (2010)
(proposing changes aimed at knowledge holder before relying upon that knowledge for use in
an invention and ensuring that patents are not granted for inventions that are not novel or
inventive).
247. WTO, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001).
248. WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001).
249. See Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A TRIPS
Compatible Approach, MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 160–63 (2005) (proposing and outlining a draft
declaration on traditional knowledge and trade).
250. WIPO IGC, MATTERS CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC
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that expressions of folklore shall be protected against “illicit
251
A
exploitation” and other prejudicial actions as defined therein.
traditional knowledge document could build upon such work. Illicit
exploitation should be explicitly linked to commercial exploitation and
limited to a clearly identifiable traditional or indigenous community.
Also, the existence of a disparity in bargaining power between the
knowledge source community and the intellectual property right holder
or commercializing entity should be among the criteria required in order
to establish illicit exploitation.
2. Mediation
The use of the WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Center as an
option for resolving traditional knowledge-related disputes has been
252
suggested and is worth exploring.
The WTO also has a dispute
resolution mechanism that can be used for TRIPS-related disputes
253
between WTO Member States. However, the WTO does not resolve
disputes that are unrelated to State obligations under the WTO
agreements, nor does it serve to resolve disputes between private
parties. The WIPO Mediation and Arbitration Center, by comparison,
was established for the purpose of resolving international disputes
254
between private parties.
It has been effectively used to resolve
255
numerous domain name disputes.
In light of the poor economic situation of many indigenous and
traditional peoples, mediation and arbitration could be quite useful as a
256
less costly alternative. In the context of alternative dispute resolution,
existing soft law norms outside the intellectual property framework that
encourage good corporate behavior could also be considered as a
RESOURCES,
TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE
AND
FOLKLORE,
WIPO
Doc.
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/3, 28 (2001) (describing the Model Provisions as a “sui generis model for
intellectual property-type protection of traditional knowledge-related subject matter.”).
Though I do not see an intellectual property model as the best option, there are some aspects
of the Model provisions that could serve as a starting point.
251. UNESCO-WIPO, Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of
Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (1985).
252. See WIPO IGC, POSITION PAPER OF THE ASIAN GROUP AND CHINA, WIPO
Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/10, 2 (2001).
253. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6.
ARBITRATION
AND
MEDIATION
CENTER,
254. WIPO
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/background.html.
255. WIPO
UDRP
Domain
Name
Decisions
(gTLD),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisionsx/index.html.
256. See Jacques de Werra, Fighting Against Biopiracy: Does the Obligation to Disclose
in Patent Applications Truly Help?, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 174–78 (2009)
(proposing the use of arbitration and mediation to resolve traditional knowledge cases).
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resource. Any such process would have to be sensitive to the reality
that in such disputes, one side could have significantly more financial or
258
informational resources.
It would be important to take this into
account in order to adequately address the concerns of both the
intellectual property right holder and the relevant traditional knowledge
community.
3. Capacity Building
WIPO and the WTO could assist developing countries and
indigenous peoples in documenting their traditional knowledge. India
established a Traditional Knowledge Digital Library consisting of
200,000 traditional Indian medicine formulations and gave the
European Patent Office access to the database for the purposes of
259
patent searches and examinations. According to the Government of
India, there have been more than 2,000 cases annually of
misappropriation of Indian traditional medicinal knowledge since the
260
time the WIPO IGC was established. Nonetheless, the documentation
has been useful in enabling the Indian government to contest certain
261
patents. WIPO and the WTO already provide technical assistance to
262
developing countries.
For those who cannot afford to collect the
relevant traditional knowledge data and set up systems such as that
developed by India, technical assistance could be provided through
existing international mechanisms.
4. Education
WIPO should continue to promote further education on the use of
the existing intellectual property system in order to assist traditional
263
knowledge communities to prevent misappropriation.
Although the
257. See, e.g., The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary
and Clarifications, COMM. ON INT’L INV. AND MULTINATIONAL ENTER. (Oct. 31, 2001),
available at http://busa.org.za/docs/Guidelines.pdf.
258. Some multinational corporations have revenues greater than the gross domestic
product of entire countries. This may make it difficult for some countries to adequately
represent their position.
See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 73–75 (2007).
259. WIPO IGC, REPORT ¶ 42, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009).
260. Id.
261. For example, the patent related to turmeric.
262. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 67 (provision on technical cooperation);
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 4(v) (amended
1979) (provision on technical cooperation).
263. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 4(vi)
provides that WIPO “shall assemble and disseminate information concerning the protection
of intellectual property . . . .”
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existing intellectual property regime may favor industrialized countries,
it is important to acknowledge that some of the intangible property that
may be described as traditional knowledge is protectable under the
current law.
5. National Measures
Some countries have taken measures to explicitly protect their
traditional knowledge and cultural property in the absence of an
264
international agreement.
This is an important step because, as
sovereign states, national governments control access to their territories
and resources. If biopiracy, for example, is a significant problem for a
particular nation, then tighter national controls will have a greater effect
than an international instrument to protect traditional knowledge as a
new form of intangible property. Unfortunately, some governments
may not be sufficiently resourced to exercise the necessary control.
Further, the affected community may be a minority group whom the
government does not effectively represent. This presents a variety of
challenges that would have to be addressed at the national level and
possibly with the assistance of the international community.
CONCLUSION
Classical intellectual property rights serve a public function in
exchange for the time-limited private right that is granted by the state.
Property rights in intangible goods must be justified because they
effectively remove certain categories of knowledge products from the
public sphere. As discussed, there is a risk of public harm, including an
undue concentration of power, in creating excessively strong intellectual
property rights. Likewise, there is a risk of harm if intellectual property
law develops to include subject matter that would be better protected
through the use of a less monopolistic means.
Certainly, the international intellectual property system needs to
reflect competing values, which means it must recognize and respect
other interests. As intellectual property minimum standards have

264. WIPO IGC, REPORT ¶ 20, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/14/12 (2009); WIPO
IGC, Comparative Summary of TCE Sui Generis Legislation, Annex II, WIPO Doc.
GRTKF/IC/9/INF/4; Copyright Act 2005, § 17 (Ghana) (providing perpetual protection for
Ghanaian folklore); N.Z. Trade Marks Act, 2002, § 17 (prohibiting the registration of marks
that are likely to offend a segment of the community, including the Maori); Law introducing a
Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples Derived from
Biological Resources Law No. 27811, 2002 (Peru) (providing sui generis protection for
indigenous knowledge); Special System for the Collective Property Rights of Indigenous
Peoples Law No. 20, June 26, 2000 (Pan.).
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become globally enforceable through TRIPS, it is essential to take into
account divergent views, histories, and philosophies. The difficulty with
TRIPS and the subsequent “TRIPS plus” agreements is that they may
be seen as privileging Western ideologies and values.
Nonetheless, as the global community moves towards greater
integration, it is counterproductive to develop what amounts to a
“Western” intellectual property system alongside a “non-Western”
intellectual property system. There appears to be little to no benefit in
creating or reinforcing what appears to be a cultural divide in the
265
protection of intangible goods.
Moreover, developing countries and
indigenous peoples may find that they face increased costs and reduced
access to traditional knowledge goods. This may be especially true for
goods that originate outside of their particular territories or
communities. This outcome would be contrary to the equity-oriented
values that appear to be an important element of traditional knowledge
protection.
At the same time, a distributive justice approach to intellectual
property law requires that the problems in the existing system be
addressed. Many scholars have articulated the case for a more balanced
intellectual property regime that makes room for competing values and
interests. It is possible, and preferable, to address the underlying issues
rather than to expand a system which has yet to be shown to be
beneficial for every society. If the goal of access to affordable
knowledge and information is a worthy one, then an assessment of
traditional knowledge from a distributive justice perspective leads to the
conclusion that a sui generis intangible property right in traditional
knowledge may not be the most appropriate response to the problems
of bio-piracy and misappropriation.
The corollary to this position is that the international community
should be mindful of the need to balance rights and obligations in the
development of international intellectual property law and policy.
Unfortunately, the recent negotiations on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (“ACTA”) serve as yet another example of an expanding
protectionist intellectual property model that predominantly favors
266
industrialized countries’ interests. It should come as no surprise then
265. If one accepts the view that traditional knowledge represents intangible
developing country goods while intellectual property represents intangible developed country
goods, then from that standpoint, the cultural divide already exists. As I argue in this paper,
however, this dichotomy is not accurate.
266. For the position of the Government of the United States, see
http://www.ustr.gov/acta. For more critical perspectives, see Professor Michael Geist’s
commentary at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4525/135/.
See also American
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if developing countries push back on matters, like traditional
knowledge, that are of concern to them. Developing countries may
quite reasonably perceive the negotiations on ACTA as industrialized
countries working together to strengthen protection for their intangible
goods while ignoring the needs of the majority of the world. In light of
their continued interest in improving global protection for intellectual
property, any arguments put forth by industrialized countries to dispel
the need for traditional knowledge protection may appear to be
contradictory and self-serving. Regrettably, what seems to be absent is
an instrumentalist analysis of the objectives of intellectual property
policy. Ideally, this should include an assessment of the benefit to the
global public that comprises the international community.

University,
PIJIP,
Urgent
ACTA
Communiqué,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique.
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